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ABSTRACT 
This Article provides a democratic assessment of the corporate 
lawmaking structure in the United States. It draws upon the basic 
democratic principle that those affected by legal rules should have a voice 
in determining the substance of those rules. Although other commentators 
have noted certain undemocratic aspects of corporate law, this Article 
aims to present a more comprehensive assessment of the corporate 
regulatory regime. It departs from prior accounts by looking past the 
states’ role to consider the ways that federal regulation shores up the 
legitimacy of the overarching structure.  
This focus on the federal role provides some comfort on a democratic 
account, but also counsels caution with respect to continuing efforts to 
limit the scope of the federal role within the corporate governance 
structure. At the federal level, Congress has chosen to regulate corporate 
matters by setting broad policy objectives and delegating administrative 
tasks to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The democratic 
legitimacy of the corporate regulatory regime thus requires proper respect 
for the discretion that Congress has vested in the agency.  
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This Article therefore urges skepticism toward efforts to constrain the 
SEC’s regulatory role through judicial challenges to its rulemaking 
authority. It argues that the agency’s ability to respond deftly to market 
crises and scandals has been hampered unnecessarily by a tradition of 
aggressive judicial review of agency rulemaking. While rooted in concerns 
for preserving democratic accountability, this tradition has undermined 
the very values it seeks to protect. Because the procedures for SEC 
rulemaking comport well with democratic principles, the agency deserves 
more deference than courts have been willing to allow. 
The analysis has implications for current proposals to reform 
regulation of the national financial markets. Calls to reduce or weaken the 
SEC’s role in financial regulation should give pause to those concerned 
with the democratic integrity of our regulatory processes. It is the SEC’s 
political independence that bolsters its ability to navigate the rough 
terrain of regulating the powerful industries within its jurisdiction. 
Enhancing rather than diminishing the agency’s independence should be a 
central element of proposals to reform our financial regulatory system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The impact of corporate law on citizens is often understated. We rely 
on corporate law to mediate the ever-present tension between authority 
and accountability which in turn determines whether those with the power 
to control a corporation‘s decisions will act with diligence or indifference 
when overseeing decisions that affect the interests of shareholders, 
creditors, employees, and the larger society. Corporate law rules often 
dictate whether the victim of an accident will receive compensation for an 
injury, or if workers lose their livelihoods when a plant is closed or jobs 
transferred overseas.  
It therefore seems appropriate that citizens throughout the country have 
the ability to influence the substance of corporate law rules, just as we 
expect input on criminal and environmental laws. Our system of 
government, after all, rests on the principle that citizens should have a 
voice in shaping the substance of the rules that affect their lives. It is this 
guiding principle that confers legitimacy to the laws that govern our 
society.  
Unfortunately, our system for crafting corporate law rules does not 
always comport with this democratic ideal. A significant portion of 
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substantive law is set at the state level—and one small state, Delaware, 
dominates this process. Further, the task of drafting Delaware‘s corporate 
law is delegated to a small group of private lawyers, most of whom 
represent large corporate interests in their professional capacities.
1
 
Although many scholars have decried the democratic shortcomings of this 
arrangement, to date the analysis remains incomplete.
2
 To fully assess the 
democratic legitimacy of our corporate regulatory regime, we must also 
factor in the role of federal regulation which introduces important 
democratic safeguards to the system.  
This Article is intended to fill a gap in the literature by broadening and 
sharpening the democratic assessment of American corporate law. It 
applies basic principles of contemporary democratic theory to an analysis 
of the structure of the corporate regulatory apparatus. It departs from prior 
analysis by looking beyond the state role to consider how regulation at the 
federal level shores up the legitimacy of the overarching structure. This 
focus on the federal role provides comfort on a democratic account, but 
also counsels caution with respect to current trends in the corporate 
regulatory landscape. 
Although the base level of corporate law is crafted by states through 
statutes and common law decision making, the federal government 
provides a crucial regulatory overlay through federal securities laws 
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
various self-regulatory organizations (SROs) within its purview.
3
 This 
regulatory redundancy, through which multiple regulators exercise 
authority over similar conduct, is a much maligned feature of our 
corporate governance regime. Yet, on a democratic analysis, such 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and 
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885 (1990); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2006); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the 
Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 863–65 (1969). 
 2. Concerns with the undemocratic underpinnings of corporate law animate the race to the 
bottom school of corporate scholarship. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Comment, supra note 1. Recently scholars 
have more directly addressed the democratic weaknesses in the corporate law structure by 
recommending abandonment of the internal affairs doctrine as a choice of law rule. See Kent 
Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
135, 136–38 (2004); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the 
Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 381, 383 (2005). 
 3. The most significant self-regulatory organizations are the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), Nasdaq and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which was formed by the 
2007 merger of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the regulatory arm of the 
NYSE. Congress also weighs in on corporate governance matters through criminal, tax and other 
statutory provisions which aim to influence corporate conduct. See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, Tax, 
Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1159, 1160–61 (2004). 
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redundancy is properly seen as a critical element in a rulemaking system 
that allows certain centers of authority to function in secrecy, sheltered 
from public demands for accountability.  
Because federal regulation helps compensate for the democratic 
deficiencies of state corporate law, the soundness of the entire regime 
depends upon the durability of each of its component parts. Attempts to 
dismantle or disable a component of the structure therefore threaten to 
strip the entire system of its integrity. Thus, to the extent that broad SEC 
authority helps to confer legitimacy to the corporate regulatory structure, 
judicial constraints on the SEC‘s administrative discretion risk 
undermining the legitimacy of the entire regime. 
This Article therefore questions efforts to limit the SEC‘s regulatory 
power through judicial challenges to its rulemaking authority. It argues 
that the SEC‘s ability to respond deftly to market crises and scandals has 
been hampered unnecessarily by a longstanding tradition of aggressive 
judicial review of agency decision making. This tradition, while rooted in 
concerns for preserving accountability, has undermined the very values it 
seeks to protect. Because the procedures for agency rulemaking comport 
well with democratic values, agencies deserve more deference than the 
courts have been willing to allow.  
This pattern of intrusive judicial review drives agencies to rely more 
heavily on less formal modes of regulation that are free from the 
deliberative requirements Congress has wisely imposed on agencies. The 
lack of transparency for these more informal policies makes it harder for 
regulated parties to comply with the ―rules‖ the agency prescribes. Greater 
judicial deference to SEC decision making would help restore the balance 
of authority that Congress has sought to maintain since the advent of the 
modern system of securities regulation. 
This analysis has implications for current proposals to reform 
regulation of the national financial markets.
4
 Although beyond the scope 
of this Article, proposals to diminish the SEC‘s role in financial regulation 
or to curtail the SEC‘s enforcement powers5 should give pause. It is the 
 
 
 4. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1073, 1092–93 (2005) (advocating transferring the SEC‘s responsibilities to the Treasury Department 
and the Justice Department); DEP‘T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008). Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson released the Blueprint in 
March of 2008 in the midst of the market upheavals caused by the collapse of Bear Stearns and the 
related subprime mortgage crisis. Although released amid the turmoil these crises wrought, the plan 
itself had been under development for more than a year. Id. at 1. 
 5. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 11, 21 (proposing a merger of the SEC and the 
Commodities and Futures Exchange Commission and transferring enforcement authority to SROs). 
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SEC‘s political independence that bolsters its ability to navigate the rough 
terrain of regulating the powerful industries within its jurisdiction. 
Incremental adjustment to the regulatory structure rather than a major 
overhaul seems a superior approach to achieving necessary improvements 
to the corporate regulatory system. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays the theoretical 
groundwork by proposing a set of ideals for a corporate lawmaking 
process that fairly reflects broadly accepted democratic values. Drawing 
on deliberative democracy theory, it identifies reasoned debate, broad 
public participation, transparency, and accountability as values that should 
be respected in an ideal corporate lawmaking process. Part II assesses the 
state lawmaking processes in Delaware and other states against these 
ideals and concludes that such procedures fall short. Part III examines the 
federal regulatory overlay by assessing corporate oversight mechanisms 
employed by Congress and the SEC. It concludes that Congress‘s 
traditional deference to state authority in corporate governance garners 
legitimacy only by reason of its concomitant broad delegation of power to 
the SEC. Part III also examines the SEC‘s rulemaking procedures and 
concludes that, in principle, such practices comport better with democratic 
values than state lawmaking traditions. Part IV argues that in light of the 
SEC‘s role in supporting the legitimacy of our corporate governance 
system, efforts to constrain SEC rulemaking through judicial challenges 
are misguided. It shows that such efforts and the judicial decisions that 
support them unwisely disregard the SEC‘s importance in shoring up the 
democratic legitimacy of our corporate regulatory regime. 
I. THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY  
When applied to corporate law, democratic principles would require 
that the methods for devising the rules that govern the relationship of 
corporations and their officials to shareholders, creditors, employees, and 
society should allow for the participation of all those with an interest in the 
substance of those rules.
6
 Democratic accountability would also require 
mechanisms that allow citizens to provide feedback to their representatives 
and that facilitate continued debate on important policy issues, so policy 
adjustments can be made from time to time.
7
 Because so much of U.S. 
corporate law derives from the state of Delaware, we immediately 
 
 
 6. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 2, at 136–38; Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets and 
Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 45–46 (2005). 
 7. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 147 (1996). 
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confront a democratic dilemma.
8
 Most U.S. citizens are unrepresented in 
Delaware, thus our corporate governance system seems to fail the 
democratic test.  
Probing this apparent dilemma first requires some groundwork as to the 
principles we are seeking to uphold. This Article invokes deliberative 
democracy, an influential contemporary theory, as a guidepost for 
analyzing existing mechanisms for developing corporate law rules.
9
 
Deliberative democracy emphasizes the values of reasoned public debate 
and broad citizen participation. As such, the theory can help instruct us on 
what to look for when assessing the democratic nature of our corporate 
policymaking process.  
A. The Deliberative Model 
To stake a claim to legitimacy, American corporate law must be seen 
as democratic.
10
 For it is democracy that provides ―legitimacy‖ for 
collective decisions by which all citizens are bound.
11
 According to most 
views, such legitimacy depends on some form of participation that allows 
citizens to have a voice in shaping the substance of laws they must obey. 
Political theorists (and ordinary citizens) vary greatly in their views of the 
purposes, potential, and essential elements of democracy. Theories of 
democracy range from the most ambitious and aspirational to the most 
parsimonious and pragmatic, making precision difficult when discussing 
democracy writ large.  
The deliberative model stakes out a sensible middle ground between 
the utopian and the cynical, by combining high aspirations with realistic 
pragmatism. The theory rests on the principle that because ―[p]olitical 
 
 
 8. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. 
CORP. L. 625, 638 (2004); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of 
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576–77 (2005) (discussing Delaware‘s legitimacy deficit). 
 9. Deliberative democracy has as its intellectual antecedents discourse theory advanced by 
Jurgen Habermas and civic republicanism, as advanced by legal scholars such as Frank Michelman 
and Cass Sunstein. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 2nd prtg. 1991); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 23–24 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493, 1503–04, 1524–28 (1988).  
 10. Introduction to PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY 3, 3 (Thomas Christiano ed., 2003) 
(―Democracy provides a solution to the problem of who may legitimately participate in decision 
making about issues of great importance to a political community . . . .‖).  
 11. Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 10, at 17, 17 (―The fundamental idea of democratic legitimacy is that the 
authorization to exercise state power must arise from the collective decisions of the members of a 
society who are governed by that power.‖). 
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decisions are collectively binding . . . they should therefore be justifiable, 
as far as possible, to everyone bound by them.‖12 Its advocates promote 
deliberation as a mode of decision making (as opposed to interest group 
bargaining or majority rule) because, they claim, decisions made after 
reasoned deliberation have more legitimacy and thus are more likely to be 
accepted, even when citizens continue to disagree.
13
  
Deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of public 
participation and reasoned political discourse. Its proponents assert that 
―[w]hen citizens morally disagree about public policy . . . . [t]hey should 
deliberate with one another, seeking moral agreement when they can, and 
maintaining mutual respect when they cannot.‖14 They promote 
deliberation as an ideal mechanism for dealing with (and living with) 
moral disagreement on divisive issues such as abortion, surrogacy, organ 
donation and the distribution of scarce resources such as health care.  
Although it is infrequently acknowledged, our system of corporate 
regulation must engage a number of thorny moral problems. Corporate law 
policy must resolve such moral quandaries as whether individuals should 
be inured from responsibility for harms that result from the actions that 
they authorize and whether those who stand to benefit from corporate 
activities bear responsibility for the harms their firms impose on others.
15
 
At root, most corporate law questions concern whom among the various 
participants in a business enterprise will bear losses, compensate others, or 
reap rewards from business decisions and activities. Resolving these 
questions requires policymakers to grapple constantly with concerns for 
fairness, efficiency and justice.
16
 
The fallout from the current financial crisis highlights the moral 
dimension of corporate law. Americans and their leaders are now engaged 
 
 
 12. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 13. 
 13. Id. at 41–42 (―Even with regard to political decisions with which they disagree, citizens are 
likely to take a different attitude toward those that are adopted after careful consideration of the 
relevant conflicting moral claims and those that are adopted only after calculation of the relative 
strength of the competing political interests.‖). 
 14. Id. at 346.  
 15. Disputes over the allocation of losses cased by poor decisions, accidents or insolvency form 
the core of most corporate law cases. Corporate ―veil piercing‖ cases are one example of such 
controversies. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966) (assessing the culpability of 
the owner of several taxicab corporations for the injuries caused by a taxi from its fleet). See generally 
David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited 
Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1314–25, 1381 (2007) (―Limited liability is best understood as a 
subsidy designed to encourage business investment.‖); Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond ―Unlimiting‖ 
Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2004). 
 16. In more philosophical terms corporate law regularly embraces questions concerning official 
immunity, collective agency, collective responsibility and distributive justice. 
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in a lively debate over who should bear the brunt of the unsound business 
practices that led to the economic collapse: taxpayers, consumers, 
shareholders or business executives.
17
 The government‘s role in propping 
up failing financial institutions has provoked intense criticism.
18
 At the 
same time, government officials and commentators deride business leaders 
who reward those whose decisions contributed to their company‘s woes 
with large bonuses and other perquisites, despite record losses and 
unprecedented taxpayer support for their institutions.
19
 Given the wide 
range of views on how government should relate to business (and vice-
versa), a deliberative framework can help devise a workable decision 
making structure for managing these controversies.  
Deliberative democracy has been embraced as an analytical framework 
by legal scholars working in a range of fields.
20
 Although developed in 
part as an effort to help society better grapple with the most controversial 
moral issues confronting the nation, the model interestingly focuses on the 
very features of an ideal political structure that seem lacking in our current 
system for corporate lawmaking.
21
 By advancing a political conception of 
 
 
 17. See David M. Herszenhorn, Talks on Bailout Plan Advance, Despite Anger and Skeptics in 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at A1; Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, Geithner is 
said to have Prevailed on the Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A1; Carol J. Loomis, AIG: The 
Company that Came to Dinner, FORTUNE, Jan. 19, 2009, at 70; Adam Nagourney, Bracing for a 
Bailout Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, at A1; Robert O‘Harrow Jr. and Brady Dennis, This 
Beautiful Machine, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2008, at A1; James Surowiecki, Hazardous Materials?, 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2009, at 40. 
 18. See John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 18; Loomis, supra note 
17; John D. McKinnon, Deborah Solomon & Greg Hitt, Detroit Gets Access To Bailout Funds, Wall 
St. J., Dec. 13, 2008, at A1; Nagourney, supra note 17; Sudeep Reddy, Bear Stearns: A Year Later: 
Was Rescue the Right Call or Slippery Slope?, WALL St. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at 23.  
 19. See Cassidy, supra note 18; Liam Pleven, Serena Ng & Sudeep Reddy, AIG Faces Growing 
Wrath Over Payouts, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at A1; Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, AIG 
Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, NEW YORKER, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1; David Kiley, 
Auto Bailout: Seeking Signs of Sacrifice, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 20, 2008, http://bwdaily/dnflash/ 
content/nov2008/db20081119_54139.htm; Heather Landy, Wall Street Bonuses Draw Scrutiny in 
Bailout’s Wake, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009; James Surowiecki, Performance-Pay Perplexes, NEW 
YORKER, Nov. 12, 2007, at 34. 
 20. See, e.g., Glen Staszweski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253 
(2009); Richard J. Lazurus, Congressional Descent: Tbe [sic] Demise of Deliberative Democracy in 
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619 (2006); Ethan J. Leib, Towards a Practice of Deliberative 
Democracy: A Proposal for a Popular Branch, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 359 (2002); Linda C. McClain, 
Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1241 (1998); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 21. Corporate scholars have long expressed concerns about a number of structural aspects of the 
corporate regulatory apparatus, including Delaware‘s dominance in the corporate landscape, 
inadequate constraints on managerial discretion, lack of representation for stakeholders within the 
corporate structure, and the failure of traditional corporate law doctrines to address the problems of 
externalities. See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
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corporate law, the deliberative framework invites more citizens to 
participate in corporate law debates and promotes discussion of corporate 
law in moral terms rather than as a simple problem of private allocation of 
risks and rewards among voluntary participants in an enterprise.
22
 
Adopting the lens of deliberative democracy broadens the view of who 
has legitimate interests in crafting corporate law, and extends the scope of 
policy discussions beyond the traditional shareholder/manager 
dichotomy.
23
 This perspective can also help to dismantle the obfuscatory 
federal/state dichotomy that has long dominated corporate law 
commentary.
24
 By helping to identify key weaknesses (and sources of 
friction) within our current system, the model can also guide us as we 
implement regulatory reforms.  
B. Critical Elements 
Although a comprehensive account of deliberative democracy is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is useful to identify its key elements. 
The discussion that follows will therefore focus on the democratic criteria 
of reasoned debate, citizen participation, transparency, and 
accountability.
25
 
 
 
 22. This view of corporate law as a ―contract‖ among the various corporate participants has 
dominated corporate law commentary for decades. The ―contractarian model‖ has been advanced by 
legal scholars such as Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK 
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (developing the nexus 
of contracts model of the corporation). The perspective is also championed by scholars such as 
Stephen Bainbridge, Roberta Romano, Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008); ROBERTA 
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1995). 
 23. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (asserting the ascendancy of the shareholder primacy model for corporate 
governance). For critiques of the shareholder primacy model see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (2003) 
(arguing that corporate law discussion focuses myopically on the interests of only three of the 
significant corporate constituents: shareholders, managers and directors). 
 24. See Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate 
Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 880–81 (2006). 
 25. This discussion draws on the conception of deliberative democracy presented by Professors 
Dennis Thompson and Amy Gutmann in DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 7. Gutmann 
and Thompson use the terms reciprocity, publicity and accountability to describe roughly the same 
concepts outlined here. Id. at 12. I discuss their foundational concepts within a framework more 
conducive to an evaluation of the corporate lawmaking process. 
 Deliberative democracy is not without its critics, both within and outside of the legal academy. 
For a sampling of critical responses to the Thompson and Gutmann account, see DELIBERATIVE 
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) and Christopher 
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1. Reasoned Debate 
The deliberative democracy model hews closely to the contours of 
modern liberal democracy, but demands more of decisionmakers and 
citizens than traditional models of representative democracy. Its theorists 
assert that a workable model of democracy must squarely address ―the fact 
of reasonable pluralism‖ within our society.26 Thus a model of democracy 
must include a framework for decision making that allows citizens to 
continue living together despite persistent moral disagreement.  
Deliberative democrats advance a requirement for reasoned public 
debate, in which citizens express their preferences by giving reasons in 
terms that fellow citizens can understand, and decisionmakers provide 
citizens with reasons for their policies.
27
 Such reciprocal reason-giving 
promotes mutual respect and is more likely to lead to policies that citizens 
can accept. Democratic deliberation is favored over other methods of 
conflict resolution because ―[w]hen citizens deliberate in democratic 
politics, they express and respect their status as political equals even as 
they continue to disagree about important matters of public policy.‖28 
By asking ―citizens and officials to justify public policy by giving 
reasons that can be accepted by those who are bound by it,‖29 deliberative 
democracy stands in contrast to the more strategic pluralist model. The 
pluralist model assumes that interest groups will compete to achieve their 
policy goals, and that competing interests will balance each other to 
achieve a workable, if not entirely just, outcome most of the time.
30
 The 
traditional interest group model and its theoretical justifications favor 
more powerful interests such as business groups. Therefore, its acceptance 
as a model for political decision making confers unmerited legitimacy to 
the political status quo. When policies are based on reasons, not merely 
 
 
H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics into Law, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
95.  
 26. Cohen, supra note 11, at 18. Cohen defines reasonable pluralism as ―the fact that there are 
distinct, incompatible understandings of value, each one reasonable, to which people are drawn under 
favorable conditions for the exercise of their practical reason.‖ Id. Reasonable pluralism is evidenced 
by persistent disagreement among citizens about ―the values of choice and self-determination, 
happiness and welfare and self-actualization.‖ Id.  
 27. Gutmann and Thompson maintain that reciprocity in public deliberation requires that citizens 
―appeal to reasons or principles that can be shared by fellow citizens who are similarly motivated.‖ 
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 55. This reflects the concept of ―public reason‖ as outlined 
by John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48–54 (1993).  
 28. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 18. 
 29. Id. at 52. 
 30. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132–51 (1956); see also 
DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186–93 (1987). 
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political power, we should expect different policy outcomes in those 
arenas in which large power disparities exist among competing interest 
groups. 
2. Participation 
Citizen participation in politics forms a central element in the 
deliberative democratic model. The deliberative model (and its reason-
giving requirement) is aimed not only toward judicial and legislative 
decisionmakers, but is also urged upon ordinary citizens, policy advocates, 
and public activists, within the arena its proponents label ―middle 
democracy.‖31 Although its proponents readily concede that most political 
decisions should be made by elected representatives and other public 
officials, they also favor broader popular participation in political life.
32
 As 
Gutmann and Thompson explain, ―[w]hat makes deliberative democracy 
democratic is an expansive definition of who is included in the process of 
deliberation—an inclusive answer to the questions of who has the right 
(and effective opportunity) to deliberate or choose the deliberators, and to 
whom do the deliberators owe their justifications.‖33 
On this view, public officials ―are expected not only to deliberate 
among themselves, but also to listen to and communicate with their 
constituents.‖34 Deliberation within an array of public fora can help to 
bring previously excluded forces into politics and to draw out legitimate 
moral dissatisfactions that might otherwise be suppressed.
35
 Further, 
―citizens and their representatives are more likely to take a broader view of 
issues, and to consider the claims of more of their fellow citizens, in a 
process in which moral arguments are taken more seriously than in a 
process in which assertions of political power prevail.‖36 
 
 
 31. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 40–41. 
 32. A deliberative analysis can be equally useful when considering questions regarding the 
appropriate internal corporate governance structure for corporations; including the role of shareholders 
in corporate decision making and questions of accountability of corporate officials to shareholders, 
employees, and society. These questions are set aside in this Article, which focuses on the process of 
determining what external constraints society might impose on corporate conduct. For a discussion of 
what deliberative democracy can teach about improving internal corporate governance questions, see 
DENNIS F. THOMPSON, Restoring Distrust, in RESTORING RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT, 
BUSINESS, AND HEALTHCARE 245, 245–65 (2005). 
 33. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 9 (2004). 
 34. Id. at 30. 
 35. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 42. Public fora for democratic deliberation include 
legislative sessions, court proceedings and administrative hearings, as well as grass roots 
organizations, professional associations and shareholders‘ meetings.  
 36. Id. 
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3. Transparency  
Another key component of deliberative democracy theory is a 
requirement of transparency. Its advocates assert that officials should 
publicly state their reasons for their policy decisions.
37
 Transparency in 
policymaking is essential, both to accommodate public participation and to 
assure political accountability. Secrecy and obscurity within the 
policymaking process frustrate the objectives of public deliberation 
because citizens cannot contribute to any deliberations that occur.
38
 The 
lack of an adequate basis for assessing the performance of public officials 
also undermines the objective of accountability. Without transparency, 
citizens cannot assess the reasonableness of public policies, and are 
therefore disabled from providing the (explicit or implicit) consent that 
underlies democratic legitimacy.  
4. Accountability  
Democracy also requires that decisionmakers be held accountable for 
their decisions.
39
 In most views of democracy, representatives are 
accountable to voters, who can remove them from office if dissatisfied 
with their performance. Deliberative democrats embrace a broader view of 
democratic accountability. They argue that representatives must justify 
their decisions in moral terms not only to their own constituents, but to all 
citizens who may be affected by them.
40
  
Deliberative democracy thus broadens the scope of accountability 
beyond that embraced by pure proceduralists. Not only are representatives 
accountable to all citizens, but citizens are accountable to each other, and 
to their representatives, when they deliberate in public forums. In addition, 
on the deliberative view, accountability is an ongoing process, as officials 
present proposals, citizens respond, officials revise and so on.
41
 
 
 
 37. Id. at 95. 
 38. Id. at 101. The authors recognize the occasional need for secrecy. Id. 
 39. Id. at 128. 
 40. Id. at 129. 
 41. Id. at 131 (―Deliberative democracy does not specify a single form of representation. It 
searches for modes of representation that support the give-and-take of serious and sustained moral 
argument within legislative bodies, between legislators and the citizens, and among citizens 
themselves.‖). Id. 
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C. Broadening Perspectives on Corporate Law 
Deliberative democracy‘s well-reasoned call for a policymaking 
process marked by reasoned debate, broad participation, transparency, and 
accountability provides a useful framework for assessing the American 
corporate governance regime. Its specific prescriptions provide a 
benchmark against which to evaluate the common complaint that the 
current policymaking process is undemocratic.
42
 By adopting a vision of 
broad citizen participation in policy debates and an expansive concept of 
political accountability, the model encourages a more capacious 
perspective on the parameters of that debate, one that acknowledges the 
impact corporate law policies have on a broader range of citizens.
43
 In 
short, deliberative democracy helps instruct us on what to look for when 
assessing the democratic nature of a policymaking process. It also urges us 
to take a comprehensive perspective on what counts as corporate 
policymaking when we engage in such assessments.  
 
 
 42. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 6, at 41–42; Greenwood, supra note 2, at 384–86; 
Greenfield, supra note 2, at 137. Professors Greenfield and Greenwood both advocate abandonment or 
modification of the internal affairs doctrine as a corrective to the undemocratic nature of American 
corporate law. Compare Greenwood, supra note 6, at 41–42, and Greenwood, supra note 2, at 384–86. 
Modification of the internal affairs doctrine could increase the ability of states to promote or protect 
the interests of their citizens in ways that the current structure of corporate law makes impossible. This 
reform could allow states to calibrate some of the morally complex corporate law rules (veil piercing, 
recapitalizations, and takeover law come readily to mind) in a way that achieves a different balance 
among the interests of managers, investors, consumers, tort victims, and creditors, than the Delaware-
dominated system has produced.  
 Preserving state power, while dispersing power away from Delaware, could help to achieve a 
more democratically justifiable system. Yet, significant democratic deficiencies would remain. The 
conduct of most corporations (aside from the smallest enterprises) affects citizens throughout the 
country. Therefore, a decision making structure must produce policies that are justifiable (as far as 
possible) to all who are affected by them. Even in the absence of a choice of law rule that embraces a 
broadly construed internal affairs doctrine, a system of regulatory redundancy would remain as an 
essential component of a democratic corporate regulatory structure. For further discussion on this 
point, see infra Part II.C. 
 43. A number of corporate scholars have supported expanding the dominant conception of the 
objectives of corporate regulation. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 23, at 1189–90; Thomas W. Joo, 
Comment, Corporate Governance and the ―D-Word,‖ 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579, 1582–85 (2006) 
(discussing a societal purpose for corporate disclosure policies). Professor Donald Langevoort recently 
articulated a possible understanding of Sarbanes-Oxley as a sign that Congress is embracing the trust 
conception of the corporation more firmly than it has in the recent past. See Donald C. Langevoort, 
The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1828–33 (2007). Professor 
Roberta Karmel has made a similar argument, but she is more critical than Professor Langevoort of 
this development. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities 
and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 93–94 
(2005). 
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II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF STATE CORPORATE LAW 
This Part analyzes the process for crafting corporate law at the state 
level. It focuses on Delaware, the dominant state, and briefly reviews the 
process for crafting the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), which 
governs in twenty-nine states.
44
 It concludes that the mechanisms for 
crafting state law fail the democratic test. The state lawmaking process is 
dominated by lawyers who in their professional capacities represent 
corporate interests. Furthermore, the procedures followed in states can be 
fairly described as closed, secretive, and exclusionary, the very antithesis 
of democratic deliberation.  
A. Delaware 
Concerns about the undemocratic character of Delaware‘s dominance 
in corporate law underlie many commentators‘ longstanding disaffection 
with Delaware‘s role in setting national corporate law policy. Many critics 
have charged that state corporate law is ―manufactured‖ in an 
undemocratic process from which most Americans who are affected by the 
policies are excluded.
45
 A significant proportion of corporate regulation is 
handled at the state level, with tiny Delaware being the dominant state in 
setting corporate law rules.
46
 Because the rights and interests of 
shareholders and others who reside throughout the nation are determined 
by the laws of Delaware, where most citizens have no representation, the 
system prima facie seems undemocratic. 
The lack of representation for citizens throughout the country is the 
most salient aspect of the undemocratic nature of Delaware‘s dominance 
in corporate law. However, even putting aside the problem of 
representation, Delaware‘s lawmaking process violates most other 
 
 
 44. MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT, Introduction xix (2005). 
 45. See Cary, supra note 2, at 701 (describing Delaware as a ―pygmy‖ among the fifty states); 
Comment, supra note 1, at 870–72. 
 46. Delaware is the second smallest state in geographic area and the sixth smallest in population. 
U.S. Census Bureau Annual Population Estimates 2000 to 2008, http://www.census.gov.popest/ 
states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). Yet more than fifty percent of all U.S. publicly-
traded corporations, and sixty-three percent of all Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in 
Delaware. Delaware Division of Corporations, http://www.corp.delaware.gov (last visited Feb. 19, 
2009). Furthermore, because of the large number of corporate decisions that emanate from Delaware, 
courts in other states look to Delaware as a leader in corporate law, and follow Delaware law as 
persuasive authority in many decisions under their own statutes and common law. See, e.g., Swope v. 
Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 2001); Shoen v. Amerco, 885 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 
n.20 (D. Nev. 1994); Westar Energy, Inc. v. Lake, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1139 (D. Kan. 2007); 
Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 143 (Kan. 2003). 
  
 
 
 
 
1288 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:1273 
 
 
 
 
principles of deliberative democracy. Corporate policymaking in Delaware 
is managed primarily by three institutions: the Delaware Bar Association, 
the state legislature, and the judiciary. These three groups work 
cooperatively to fashion a body of law that preserves Delaware‘s dominant 
position in chartering large corporations.
47
 A complete understanding of 
the process for crafting corporate law in Delaware thus requires 
consideration of the roles of the each of these key players.  
1. The Delaware Bar Association  
The Delaware General Corporation Law and amendments thereto are 
crafted by an exclusive, self-perpetuating council of the Corporation Law 
Section of the Delaware Bar Association.
48
 The council consists of twenty-
one members and is dominated by attorneys who in their professional 
capacities represent the corporations and managers whose rights, duties 
and obligations are governed by corporate law.
49
 Other corporate 
constituencies (shareholders and creditors, for example) are 
underrepresented on the council.
50
  
The council meets only in private sessions and does not publicly 
discuss its deliberations until a formal proposal is presented.
51
 Only clients 
of council members enjoy easy access to the council, which enables them 
 
 
 47. Race to the top and race to the bottom advocates agree that Delaware‘s legal system is geared 
toward preserving the state‘s lead in the corporate law race. They disagree principally about whether 
the race leads to desirable or undesirable corporate law policy. See Jones, supra note 8, at 629–31. 
 48. The nominating committee of the council, made up of sitting council members, nominates 
new members to the council. Nomination is tantamount to election. Alva, supra note 1, at 899. The 
information for this account of the activities of the council is drawn principally from two sources: The 
first is a 2006 description of the functioning of the council by the reporter for the council, Lawrence 
Hamermesh, a professor at Widener University in Delaware. Hamermesh, supra note 1. The second is 
a 1990 account of the council‘s activities by Curtis Alva. Alva, supra note 1. Additional first-hand and 
near-first-hand accounts of the practices and activities of the council can be found in Comment, supra 
note 1, and Ernest L. Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporate Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409 
(1968). 
 49. Hamermesh, supra note 1, at 1755. Hamermesh, the reporter for the council, states that seven 
large commercial firms in Delaware each nominate two members to the council. Id. The other seven 
members work in smaller corporate law firms, except for Hamermesh, who is a law professor at 
Widener Law School in Wilmington. Id.  
 50. Id. at 1755–56. The council membership is evenly split between litigators and transactional 
lawyers, and includes very few lawyers (Hamermesh does not specify how many) who represent 
shareholder plaintiffs as a significant part of their practice. Id. One council member is from a firm that 
represents a number of public institutional investors. Id. The Council includes no in-house lawyers, no 
non-Delaware lawyers and only one attorney from a firm that is not based principally in Delaware. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1756 (―There is a strongly held tradition that preliminary or potential legislative 
proposals are not to be discussed with or disseminated to persons outside the firms represented on the 
Council.‖). 
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to press their interests in promoting their desired reforms.
52
 The council 
sometimes circulates proposals privately to practitioners and other parties 
with an interest in the legislation, but does not have a practice of 
publishing its proposals to the general public.
53
 Because the council‘s 
proposals are crafted in private and presented as a fait accompli, it is 
impossible for council members to hear or respond to criticisms or 
concerns of any citizens (of Delaware or otherwise) except those select 
few who have access to the process.
54
 
The council‘s proposed statutory amendments are subject to the 
approval of the full Corporation Law Section and the Executive 
Committee of the Delaware Bar Association. This formal review process 
allows other Delaware lawyers to weigh in on the relative merits of the 
council‘s proposals.55 Thus, lawyers who represent clients whose interests 
are not represented on the council can comment or object to specific 
proposed amendments.
56
 Upon approval of the Corporation Law Section 
and the Executive Committee, proposed statutory amendments are 
submitted to the Delaware General Assembly for adoption.  
2. The Delaware General Assembly 
The selectivity and the secrecy of the council‘s work would be of less 
concern if its proposals were properly vetted in the state legislature. 
Remarkably, however, the Delaware legislature adopts almost all of the 
committee‘s proposals wholesale, without so much as a committee hearing 
or floor debate.
57
 In fact, neither chamber of the Delaware General 
Assembly has a committee that focuses primarily on corporate matters.
58
 
Instead, proposals to amend the Delaware General Corporation Law are 
 
 
 52. Alva, supra note 1, at 901 (listing the types of people who can influence the work of the 
council). Hamermesh, supra note 1, at 1756 (―Council members not uncommonly receive suggestions 
for change from clients or co-counsel outside of Delaware. . . .‖). 
 53. Alva, supra note 1, at 910; Hamermesh, supra note 1, at 1757. 
 54. Hamermesh, supra note 1, at 1757 (―Council members consider it important that further 
deliberation on the proposal proceed without further input from or influence by persons outside of their 
own law firms.‖). 
 55. According to Hamermesh, this review process is almost always perfunctory. Id. at 1758 
(―These approvals usually follow Council approval in a fairly routine way, but not always.‖). 
 56. Id. (describing Corporate Counsel Section‘s objections to proposed amendments to Delaware 
General Corporation Law § 220). 
 57. Alva, supra note 1, at 915–16. Notable exceptions include the 1987 Amendments that 
adopted a new anti-takeover provision, and the 1986 amendments providing exculpation and 
indemnification for corporate directors and officers. Id. at 910–12, 915–16.  
 58. Id. at 897. 
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handled by the Judiciary Committees of the House and the Senate.
59
 
Although the preceding sentence implies that these committees meet and 
review the substance of proposed amendments, such an understanding is 
highly misleading.
60
 Instead, published accounts of the legislative process 
report that (at least some) committee members never see the bills 
containing amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law before 
voting in favor of them.
61
 
In sum, Delaware citizens who may be shareholders, employees or 
other stakeholders in corporations have little or no opportunity to learn 
about, comment on, or criticize any proposals made by the Delaware Bar 
Association‘s Corporation Law Section, which are routinely rubber-
stamped by the Delaware General Assembly. In fact, the entire legislative 
process has been almost completely privatized; the regulated entities 
through their officials and paid representatives maintain nearly complete 
control over the content of the statutes that govern their conduct. 
Some may wonder why Delaware‘s citizens tolerate this undemocratic 
outsourcing of corporate law to the Delaware Bar Association. The 
apparent answer is that Delaware citizens are aware of the Faustian 
bargain their state has struck in providing favorable corporate law rules to 
corporations in exchange for a significant subsidy by these corporations of 
their state‘s coffers.62 They therefore willingly tolerate their exclusion 
from the policy process as a reasonable price to pay for the financial 
advantages the state and its citizens gain through this arrangement.
63
 
 
 
 59. Id. at 898. 
 60. Hamermesh reports that the members of the Delaware General Assembly play no significant 
role in initiating or drafting changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law, and that amendments 
are not the product of legislative staff or of any lobbyists engaged by individual businesses. 
Hamermesh, supra note 1, at 1754. 
 61. Alva, supra note 1, at 898 (―The Committee member explained that if a corporate law bill 
has the support of the Delaware Bar Association and the Secretary of State‘s office, then it is passed 
without amendment or debate.‖). 
 62. Delaware generates $600 million in annual tax revenue from its corporate chartering 
business. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 556 & n.13 (2002). This 
amounts to almost 20% of the state budget and the equivalent of $3,000 per four-person household in 
Delaware. See id. at 556. 
 63. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate 
Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 635 (2006) (―So far as . . . concerns the people of 
Delaware, any corporate law policy that suits the chartering customers also suits them.‖); Bebchuk & 
Hamdani, supra note 62, at 553 (noting that Delaware and its citizens earn substantial profits from its 
chartering business); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 687–99 (2002) (outlining the advantages states gain from attracting out-of-state 
incorporations). 
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3. The Delaware Judiciary 
It could be argued that, with a few notable exceptions, legislative 
changes to Delaware‘s corporation law are relatively inconsequential.64 
The statute itself contains so few mandatory rules that the legislative 
amendments advanced by the Delaware Bar Association and enacted by 
the legislature amount merely to tinkering around the edges. For example, 
Delaware General Corporation law has no provisions relating to the 
fiduciary duties of corporate officials, a foundational concept in corporate 
law.
65
 Instead, fiduciary duty doctrine is entirely judge-made and is subject 
to modification and interpretation on a case-by-case basis. Delaware‘s 
corporate statute is also largely silent (and practically irrelevant) on the 
legality of takeover practices of corporate raiders and the defenses targets 
erect in seeking to retain control.
66
 The courts, rather than the legislature, 
play the leading role in determining the legality of actions taken in the 
midst of takeover contests or other battles for corporate control.
67
  
If it is correct that legislative changes advanced by the Delaware Bar 
Association rarely significantly alter the relative rights and duties of major 
corporate parties, the fact that the process excludes most interested parties 
should be of less concern. The claim that legislative changes matter little 
still invites the question of which Delaware officials are responsible for 
setting significant corporate law rules, and whether such officials are 
appropriately constrained by mechanisms that promote democratic 
accountability. Addressing this question requires scrutiny of the 
policymaking role of Delaware‘s judiciary.  
The unique role of Delaware‘s judiciary in setting national corporate 
law policy has been thoughtfully pondered in the corporate law literature. 
The standard description is that of an expert, experienced, and efficient 
judiciary, uniquely qualified to mediate the disputes of the corporate titans 
 
 
 64. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. 
L. REV. 542, 544–46 (1990); Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1600–02.  
 65. See 18b AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1460–64 (2008); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 562 (2008); 
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 298–309 (1999).  
 66. Like many other states, Delaware has adopted a ―second generation‖ anti-takeover statute of 
the type validated by the Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001). By the time of its adoption, Delaware courts had already 
approved of more potent anti-takeover devices such as the poison pill. See Moran v. Household Int‘l, 
Inc. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 67. See, e.g., Unitrin Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Paramount Commc‘ns 
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp. 493 A.2d 946 (De1. 1985). 
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that appear before them.
68
 An alternative and less widely-embraced view is 
that of self-serving apologists, committed to protecting corporate 
profligacy, Delaware‘s coffers, and their own sphere of influence.69 The 
truth most likely lies somewhere between these two extremes. 
What seems beyond dispute is that Delaware‘s judges cannot be seen 
merely as impartial arbiters of business conflicts. Indeed, they play a 
pivotal role in protecting Delaware‘s corporate chartering machinery. 
Without their continued commitment to a laissez-faire approach to 
corporate regulation, Delaware would lose its appeal to the corporate 
managers who control incorporation decisions. It should be not be 
surprising then that Delaware‘s jurists have an openly acknowledged bias 
toward maintaining the status quo, reflected in a stated preference for 
incrementalism.
70
 The Delaware judiciary also demonstrates a bent toward 
open-ended, case-specific decisions, which make it difficult for even well-
informed observers to state with confidence a legal rule or to reliably 
impart meaning to particular decisions.
71
 
Delaware judges also engage in active political advocacy for their self-
preserving approach to corporate jurisprudence, and in defense of their 
state‘s supremacy in setting national corporate policy. They eagerly court 
academic favor, appearing regularly at academic conferences, teaching 
courses at elite law schools, and publishing numerous articles that defend 
their jurisprudence and their unique policymaking role.
72
 It is difficult to 
assess the impact of these policy speeches and academic-style articles. 
They seem geared to countering or forestalling academic criticism. They 
may also be seen as an attempt to engage support for the Delaware 
judiciary‘s carefully crafted image as thoughtful, intelligent, and sincere 
experts in regulating corporate affairs.
73
 
 
 
 68. See Hamermesh, supra note 1, at 1760; Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 682–85 
(providing a positive assessment of the quality of judging in Delaware). 
 69. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 2, at 688; Mitchell, supra note 23, at 1189 (describing Delaware 
as a ―brothel of corporate law‖); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 502–03 (1987) (suggesting that Delaware 
judges prefer legal rules that support keeping corporate litigation within Delaware); Jonathan R. 
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a 
Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 279 (1990). 
 70. Hamermesh, supra note 1, at 1761. 
 71. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1009, 1105 (1997); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in 
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998); Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final 
Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, 92–101 (1990). 
 72. See Hamermesh, supra note 1, at 1759–60 & App. A (cataloguing judges‘ extra-judicial 
writings); Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1603–04 (same). 
 73. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 4 (2006) (―[J]udges care about the 
  
 
 
 
 
2009] LEGITIMACY AND CORPORATE LAW 1293 
 
 
 
 
Generally speaking, the role of the judiciary presents a theoretical 
conundrum for advocates of deliberative democracy. To perform their 
roles effectively, judges must be viewed as independent, and thus must be 
somewhat insulated from everyday political struggles. Although central to 
our constitutional structure, judicial independence conflicts squarely with 
the democratic value of accountability.
74
 Deliberative democrats resolve 
this tension by favoring an unelected, independent judiciary, while 
insisting that judges provide reasoned justifications for their decisions and 
engage in an ongoing dialogue with the public on questions of justice and 
moral responsibility.
75
 
The role of Delaware‘s judiciary seems most at odds with the principle 
of accountability—even a conception that accords proper respect for 
judicial independence. Although appointed through a state-based political 
process, Delaware judges act like and are treated as national policymakers. 
They are thus in the politically awkward position of being selected by and 
accountable to Delaware politicians and citizens, yet exercising power 
over large corporate entities and all citizens whose rights and interests are 
affected by their corporate law decisions.  
Delaware judges seem to intuitively sense a need to account more 
broadly for their judicial rulings, which may explain their national 
campaign to shore up their legitimacy.
76
 This feint at accountability is 
insufficient. Instead of providing reasoned justifications for their decisions 
and general approach to rulemaking, these judges seek sustained insulation 
from political accountability by seeking to forestall federal efforts to 
influence or set national corporate governance standards.
77
 In criticizing 
federal regulation, Delaware judges seek to preserve the accountability gap 
 
 
regard of salient audiences because they like that regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends.‖). 
 74. See George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative Victory or a 
Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543 (2008) (describing the democratic tensions 
inherent in maintaining an elected judiciary). 
 75. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Judicial Responsibility, in RESTORING RESPONSIBILITY: 
ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND HEALTHCARE 71, 71–98 (2005). 
 76. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1614 (―The extra-cameral activities . . . market Delaware 
law to the legal community . . . .‖). 
 77. See, e.g., Myron J. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 503, 506 (2007) (criticizing Sarbanes-Oxley and federal intervention in corporate governance); 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive 
Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1079–81 (2008) (defending 
Delaware‘s ―enabling‖ approach to corporate regulation); Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On 
Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1 (2005) (extolling the 
flexibility inherent in Delaware‘s indeterminate style of corporate jurisprudence); William Chandler III 
& Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary 
Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 976–79 (2003) (defending 
Delaware corporate law and criticizing Sarbanes-Oxley and related reforms). 
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by declining to acknowledge such interventions as a legitimate political 
response to public dissatisfaction with their laissez-faire approach to 
corporate law. 
B. A Note on The Model Business Corporation Act 
Although Delaware is the leader among states in fashioning the law 
and settling disputes on significant corporate matters, the Model Business 
Corporation Act (MBCA) also has a significant influence on the 
development of corporate law standards throughout the country. A 
majority of states have adopted some version of the MBCA.
78
 Therefore, 
the workings of the American Bar Association‘s (ABA) Corporate Law 
Committee (the ―Committee‖), which drafts the MBCA, deserve close 
scrutiny.  
The ABA Committee drafts and proposes amendments to the MBCA. 
The Committee is comprised of a chair and twenty-five members, all of 
whom are lawyers.
79
 The chair of the ABA‘s Section of Business Law 
appoints the Committee‘s chair who helps select the remaining committee 
members.
80
 Committee members serve for staggered six-year terms, and 
by tradition, members are not reappointed for consecutive terms.
81
 What is 
most striking is the Committee‘s unique and privileged status among ABA 
committees and councils. Its member selection process and the breadth of 
its authority and autonomy is unparalleled within the ABA. On both these 
counts the Committee avoids several of the accountability checks that 
constrain the policy-making latitude of other ABA committees. 
Until recently, the Committee was chaired by E. Norman Veasey, a 
former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, now a partner in a 
major corporate law firm.
82
 Veasey is a vocal advocate for the supremacy 
of state corporate law. Like other Delaware jurists, he has been a critic of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the recent trend toward expanded federal involvement 
 
 
 78. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, Introduction xix. Twenty-nine states have adopted all or 
substantially all of the MBCA. Four other states have statutes based on the 1969 version of the Model 
Act. Id. 
 79. Id. at xx. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Veasey is a partner in the Delaware office of Weil, Gotshal & Manges. Veasey, E. Norman—
People—Weil, Gotshal & Manges, http://www.weil.com/enormanveasey (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
The current chair of the Committee is Herbert Wander, a lawyer at Katten Munchin Rosenman in 
Chicago. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP—Professionals—Wander, Herbert S., http://www.kattenlaw. 
com/Herbert-s-wander (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
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in U.S. corporate governance.
83
 The Committee‘s membership includes a 
mix of partners from law firms, academics, in-house counsel, and judges 
or former judges. Although its members hail from twelve different states, a 
disproportionate number are from Delaware.
84
  
On the whole, the ABA‘s drafting procedures are more transparent than 
Delaware‘s. The Committee meets quarterly, generally for two days at a 
time. These meetings are open to ABA members and the public. However, 
in practice, attendance is generally limited to Committee members. Much 
of the Committee‘s substantive work is performed by task forces that 
review and propose revisions to various sections of the MBCA.
85
  
The Committee publishes its proposals in the Business Lawyer, a 
publication of the Business Law Section of the ABA which is widely-read 
by lawyers and other governance activists. It also posts its proposals on its 
Web site. Upon publishing its proposals and preliminary drafts, the 
Committee invites comments from the public and publishes the comment 
letters on the ABA‘s web site. The notice and comment procedure 
provides opportunities for deliberation, and is analogous to the notice and 
comment process followed by federal agencies.
86
 The process is far from 
ideal, however, as it is dominated by lawyers and thus excludes 
perspectives that may be offered by the general public. 
After moving through the notice and comment procedures, the 
revisions are adopted by the Committee and become part of the Model 
Act. The Committee‘s work is not subject to approval or review by any 
other body of the ABA, including the Business Law Section (under the 
auspices of which it functions),
87
 making the Committee unique among 
ABA bodies.
88
 
 
 
 83. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder Franchise is Not a Myth, 93 VA. L. REV. 811 
(2007); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGuglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law 
and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1399 (2005) (extolling Delaware judiciary‘s jurisprudential excellence); E. Norman Veasey, State-
Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 441 (2003).  
 84. 2004–2005 Committee members resided or practiced in the following states: Virginia (2); 
Delaware (5), Florida, Massachusetts (2), Connecticut, California (3), Iowa, Washington (2), 
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, Maine, New York and Illinois. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, 
Introduction xx, xxxix. The fact that there were more committee members from Delaware (including, 
until recently, the chair) than any other state is notable considering that Delaware is not an MBCA 
state.  
 85. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, Introduction xx. 
 86. See infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 87. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, Introduction xxi. 
 88. Most policies of the ABA are subject to review by its Board of Governors, and the ABA 
House of Delegates. See American Bar Association, Constitution and Bylaws (2007–2008), 
http://www.abanet.org/policy/cpo304.pdf. Generally, the House of Delegates formulates policy for the 
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The Committee lacks power to directly effect changes to any state‘s 
corporation statute. Instead, state bar associations tend to take the lead in 
prodding their state legislatures to incorporate ABA-prescribed provisions 
into law. The sporadic, scattershot history of state-by-state adoption 
suggests that in most states the amendment process is less automatic than 
Delaware‘s.89  
The state of Massachusetts‘s recent experience in ―modernizing‖ its 
business corporation statute illustrates the effort involved in moving 
Model Act revisions through a state legislature. In 2003, Massachusetts 
replaced its antiquated business corporation law with an MBCA-based 
statute. Unlike the assembly line process in place in Delaware, the effort to 
draft and persuade the Massachusetts legislature to adopt the new statute 
spanned more than fifteen years.
90
 This process suggests that states other 
than Delaware engage in a greater degree of deliberation when handling 
substantive questions of corporate law.
91
  
C. Limits on States’ Claims as Corporate Regulators 
A strong theme in contemporary legal theory counsels devolution to 
local authorities as an elixir for promoting more democratic governance.
92
 
Local governance advocates might therefore assert that the proper fix to 
Delaware‘s dominance in corporate law is to augment the authority of 
other states in this arena. Shifting power from Delaware to more populous 
states like California and New York could better reflect interests of a 
wider range of constituencies, as recent judicial skirmishes over the 
 
 
ABA. Id. at 13. However the Board of Governors may perform the policy making functions of the 
House in between the body‘s meetings. Id. 
 89. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, Introduction ix. 
 90. Massachusetts lawyers formed a task force in 1989 to seriously consider proposals to 
overhaul the state‘s corporation statute. The task force studied the existing law, considered complaints 
from practitioners regarding its inadequacies, and weighed the option of piecemeal reform against calls 
for a fresh start. The committee also looked at the MBCA model, carefully considered its strengths and 
weaknesses, and rejected a number of its provisions in favor of preserving extant Massachusetts law. 
See Stanley Keller & Robert L. Nutt, Progress Report, Task Force on the Revision of the 
Massachusetts Business Corporation Law, BOSTON B.J., Nov./Dec. 1990, 5; Case & Statute 
Comments, The New Massachusetts Business Corporation Act, Chapter 127, Acts of 2003, 88 MASS. 
L. REV. 213 (2004). 
 91. A stark counter-example to this deliberative process is provided by Massachusetts‘s rushed 
adoption of anti-takeover legislation to protect Norton Corporation from an unwanted hostile takeover 
bid in 1990. See Kathleen Pierce, Dukakis Signs Norton Bill but BTR Vows New Law Won’t Derail its 
Bid, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Apr. 18, 1990, at C1 (reporting on a new law adopted in 
one day to require that all Massachusetts corporations have staggered boards). 
 92. See, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377 
(2001). 
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application of California‘s pseudo-foreign corporation law reveal.93 Yet, 
the localization of corporate governance lawmaking would not resolve 
many of the problems identified above.  
A singular reliance on states to craft corporate law policies would not 
satisfy the requirements of deliberative democracy without the added 
reassurance that a federal overlay provides. The impact of corporate 
governance policies (including securities regulation) continuously traverse 
state boundaries and cannot be handled exclusively on a state by state 
basis, as any state‘s policies inevitably impact citizens living in other parts 
of the country. The federal overlay provides citizens the chance to object 
to, and to change, those rules that seem unjustified. Whether the rules are 
set in New York, New Jersey, Delaware, or California, it is the possibility 
of federal intervention and supplementation that helps to preserve the 
legitimacy of a state-centered regime. 
III. THE FEDERAL OVERLAY 
Critics of the state-based corporate governance regime often advocate 
shifting the center of gravity on corporate law issues from Delaware to 
Washington, D.C.
94
 Shifting corporate law making from the states to 
Congress would address some of the deliberative inadequacies of the 
lawmaking process at the state level. Still, a number of political constraints 
hamper Congress‘s ability to effectively regulate corporate conduct.  
This helps explain why Congress defers to states on most corporate law 
issues and delegates the task of implementing federal corporate 
governance standards to the SEC. Congress has also imparted significant 
power to the SRO‘s, subject to SEC oversight and supervision.95 
This Part assesses some of the deliberative advantages of federal-level 
corporate regulation, while noting the political realities that thwart 
achievement of a deliberative ideal. It argues that Congress has adopted a 
pragmatic approach to grappling with such constraints by utilizing the 
securities laws to set broad policy objectives and relying on the SEC, an 
 
 
 93. See Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s Vantage Point: The Empire Strikes Back in the Post-Post-
Enron Era, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 93–97 (2008); Matt Stevens, Note, Internal Affairs Doctrine: 
California Versus Delaware in a Fight for the Right to Regulate Foreign Corporations, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 1047 (2007). 
 94. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 51–76 (1976); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum 
Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947, 971–74 (1990).  
 95. Securities Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000). 
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independent administrative agency, to further articulate and enforce a 
broad Congressional mandate. Certain institutional characteristics equip 
the SEC to facilitate democratic deliberation over appropriate corporate 
law policy, providing a critical supplement to Congress‘s efforts to 
regulate corporate conduct. 
A. The Role of Congress 
On balance, the federal legislative process for corporate regulatory 
matters comports better with our specified democratic criteria than the 
procedures followed in states. Most clearly, concerns about the lack of 
political representation in the state lawmaking process fade at the federal 
level, where all adult citizens enjoy political representation. The interests 
of the federal legislature are also less parochial than those of the states, 
which in the classic ―race‖ paradigm are concerned more with enhancing a 
revenue stream of franchise taxes and filing fees than with adopting 
appropriate substantive standards.
96
 As raising revenue is achieved 
primarily through the tax code, Congress is less likely to focus on 
increasing revenues when considering corporate law issues. Federal 
legislators must also balance the interests of competing constituencies in 
ways that legislators in Delaware and other states can avoid.
97
  
Although subject to significant limitations discussed below, Congress 
does far better than states in satisfying deliberative democracy‘s criteria of 
reasoned debate, public participation, transparency, and accountability. In 
the classic paradigm, members of Congress engage in a bipartisan decision 
making process that is buffeted by a number of institutional checks. 
Before becoming law, legislation must move through respective 
committees in the House and Senate, be considered on the floor of both 
chambers, reconciled in conference committee and signed by the 
President.
98
 These multiple checkpoints within the normal legislative 
process seem well-designed to inculcate discussion, debate, and 
compromise by national policymakers.  
Although this textbook process does not always rule the day, the model 
still prevails often enough in practice.
99
 When considering significant 
 
 
 96. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2495 (2005). 
 97. See id. at 2503–04. 
 98. For an overview of the legislative process, see ROBERT B. DOVE, ENACTMENT OF A LAW 
(1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/enactment/enactlaw.pdf. 
 99. Frequently, major legislation bypasses the conventional committee process. See BARBARA 
SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 3–7 
(1997) (describing the increase in unorthodox legislative practices since the 1970s). Major legislation 
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legislation, Congress often hears testimony from experts, concerned 
citizens, and advocacy groups and considers multiple perspectives on an 
issue.
100
 The committee process provides for give and take among 
legislators as they seek to craft legislation that can attract majority support. 
Members of Congress also engage in debate on the House and Senate 
floors, with members giving reasons for supporting or opposing 
legislation.
101
  
The legislative process is also more inclusive than state corporate 
lawmaking. In theory, at least, the halls of Congress are open to all 
constituents and advocates for shareholders, workers, consumers, and the 
environment enjoy freer access to the national policy process.
102
 Unlike 
the state paradigm of corporate law as a contest between shareholder and 
management interests, at the federal level the concerns of other 
constituents are more likely to hold sway.
103
 As one example, a concern 
for constituents other than managers or shareholders is evident in several 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley)
104
 that are 
aimed squarely at protecting workers rights.
105
  
When dealing with corporate law issues, Congress also conducts its 
business in a more open and transparent manner than the states. In contrast 
to the states, where bar committees operate behind closed doors, Congress 
conducts much of its business in the public eye. Committee hearings and 
floor sessions are open to the public and broadcast on C-Span. Policy 
proposals are formalized as bills and are made available for public 
 
 
may be assigned to multiple committees in each chamber or may be assigned to a task force selected 
by party leadership, one that may even exclude members of the minority party. Id. 
 100. See Jones, supra note 8, at 636–37 & n.68 (describing testimony in Sarbanes-Oxley 
hearings). 
 101. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1551–55 (2005) (summarizing floor debates on Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 102. Roe, supra note 96, at 2522. 
 103. Id. at 2496 (national ideologies and policy goals weigh more heavily in Washington than in 
Delaware); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the 
Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1595–96 (2006). 
 104. Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 
29 U.S.C. (2006)) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley]. 
 105. Section 306 of Sarbanes-Oxley imposes a blackout on executives‘ transactions in company 
stock received as compensation during any period in which rank and file employees are prohibited 
from trading in such stock in their employee benefit plans. Sarbanes-Oxley § 306 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7244). Sections 806 and 1107 protect corporate whistleblowers who report evidence of 
corporate wrongdoing to their supervisors or to government officials. Id. §§ 806, 1107 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1514A and 1513(e)); see also Roe, supra note 96, at 2522; Langevoort, supra note 43, at 
1828–89 (noting broader societal themes permeating the Enron and WorldCom sagas). 
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inspection as they move through the legislative process.
106
 Public scrutiny 
of Congressional action is facilitated by the many journalists, lobbyists, 
interest groups, and policy advocates that keep a close eye on 
Congressional action with respect to issues of public concern.
107
  
Finally, members of Congress are accountable to the public and risk 
replacement if they fail to adequately address citizen‘s concerns. Less 
directly, but more consistently, our representatives are required to 
constantly justify their decisions on issues that are salient to the public. 
Between election cycles politicians are expected, and often compelled, to 
comment and act on issues of public concern. The media, constituents, 
policy advocates, and analysts all contribute to sustaining these 
accountability mechanisms.  
B. The Example of Sarbanes-Oxley 
An examination of the history surrounding the enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley demonstrates that Congress follows a more transparent, inclusive, 
and deliberative process when enacting major corporate legislation than 
what commonly occurs in Delaware or other states. Congress engaged in 
significant deliberation throughout the process of fashioning a legislative 
response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals.
108
 After the exposure of 
Enron‘s frauds, the House and Senate committees began to hold hearings 
to inquire into what went wrong.
109
 Principals in the scandal were called to 
testify before Congress.
110
 Coverage of the hearings was available on C-
Span, with the most dramatic scenes replayed on the nightly news. As the 
 
 
 106. There are, of course, significant departures from this norm. SINCLAIR, supra note 99, at 3–8 
(1997) (describing the increase in unorthodox legislative practices since the 1970s); see also GLEN S. 
KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001) (discussing the 
increase of omnibus legislation in Congress); JOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT: 
STALEMATE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1995) (arguing that politicians will often reject compromise 
because maintaining disagreements can lead to political advantages). 
 107. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE, WHO DELIBERATES? 5–11 (1996) (discussing the role of the media in 
facilitating democratic deliberation). 
 108. Although some commentators lament the brevity of the Sarbanes-Oxley floor debates, such 
an emphasis minimizes the importance of the extensive committee hearings and public discussion that 
preceded the legislation‘s introduction. See Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as 
Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1852 (2007) 
(―[F]loor debate is not where real deliberation takes place in the U.S. Congress.‖). 
 109. J. MICHAEL ANDERSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ENRON: A SELECT 
CHRONOLOGY OF CONGRESSIONAL, CORPORATE, AND GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES (2002), available at 
http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9659.pdf. During 2001 and 2002 Congress held 
thirty-seven hearings related to the Enron scandal. Id. 
 110. Those testifying included Enron executives Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and Sherron 
Watkins. Id. at 12–13, 23. 
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government inquiries proceeded, the media also engaged in extensive 
investigation and reporting, transmitting emerging details to the public on 
an ongoing basis.  
Congress‘s initial response to Enron was to do little or nothing. 
President Bush pressed for SEC reforms and more responsible self-
regulation. Although Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes proposed 
comprehensive reform, including greater accounting oversight, Republican 
Representative Michael Oxley introduced more modest legislation that 
was approved by the House in April 2002.
111
 Meanwhile, Senator 
Sarbanes‘s more sweeping bill stalled in the Senate until the WorldCom 
scandal broke.
112
 The public outrage and media firestorm that followed 
WorldCom‘s demise led Congress to rush through legislation in advance 
of looming mid-term elections.
113
 
In addition to the Congressional testimony and debates, continuous 
media reporting primed informal public deliberation on the proper 
legislative response to the corporate scandals.
114
 Special committees 
convened by courts and corporations published reports of their findings.
115
 
The SEC and NYSE embarked on reforms that inspired further public 
discussion of governance policies. Even during the final march toward 
enactment, public deliberation continued in Congress among party leaders 
and in floor debates, during which some Senators introduced amendments 
from the Senate floor. After the legislation passed both houses of 
Congress, a conference committee ironed out a compromise to reconcile 
the two bills, which retained most of the provisions from the Senate 
version. Finally, President Bush signed the legislation in a public 
ceremony, publicly stating his reasons for supporting the new law.
116
 
The preceding discussion should not be taken to imply that the 
legislative process surrounding the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley was a 
paragon of ideal public deliberation. Professors Romano, Ribstein, Butler 
and others have accurately identified numerous shortcomings in the 
 
 
 111. Romano, supra note 101, at 1550–53. 
 112. Id. at 1557–58. 
 113. Id. at 1558; Richard A. Oppel Jr., Negotiators Agree on Broad Changes in Business Laws, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at A1. 
 114. Romano, supra note 101, at 1559. Accounting and governance scandals also occurred at 
other well-known companies such as Qwest, Global Crossing, Adelphia and Tyco, further fueling the 
public‘s sense of outrage. See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: 
Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 137 (2006). 
 115. See, e.g., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION (2002).  
 116. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2002, at A1. 
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deliberative process.
117
 These critics have questioned the quality of 
information considered by Congress, arguing that many of the legislation‘s 
central proposals lacked empirical support.
118
 They also express dismay 
that several key substantive provisions, such as the controversial ban on 
executive loans, and the attorney conduct provisions were adopted as floor 
amendments without adequate public justification or debate.
119
 More 
generally, critics have condemned the entire legislative process 
surrounding the Act as a ―rush to judgment‖; insisting that the near 
unanimity of Congressional support indicated a shameful abandonment of 
principles by republican legislators, rather than a laudable sign of political 
unity.
120
  
Although these criticisms of Sarbanes-Oxley are overstated, they do 
expose several drawbacks to according Congress a leading role in 
managing corporate regulation. Only a few significant items can make it to 
the top of the legislative agenda at any given time, which means that 
Congress cannot sustain consistent attention to corporate regulatory 
matters. These limitations often cause Congress to respond reflexively to 
external shocks, rather than working to maintain an even keel.
121
 
Furthermore, the partisanship and ideological rigidity that characterizes 
Congress in recent decades also creates obstacles to meaningful 
substantive debates. These factors limit Congress‘s ability to act decisively 
on corporate issues except in times of crisis. In such circumstances, it is 
almost inevitable that the perceived exigencies would detract from the 
thoughtfulness, deliberation, and reciprocity that represent the hallmarks 
of an ideal deliberative process.
122
  
 
 
 117. Romano, supra note 101, at 1564–68; HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE‘VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 14–16 (2006). 
 118. Romano, supra note 101, at 1526–29. But see Prentice & Spence, supra note 108 (disputing 
Romano‘s analysis). 
 119. Romano, supra note 101, at 1562–63; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating 
in Haste, Repenting in Leisure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69, 70–71 (2006). 
 120. Romano, supra note 101, at 1564–68 (―Why Did the Republicans Support the Democrats‘ 
Bill?‖); BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 117, at 14–16. 
 121. The recent political maneuverings that surrounded the enactment of the 2008 federal 
financial bailout package demonstrate once again the potential peril of Congress‘s reactive stance on 
corporate issues. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765. What was initially a three page proposal penned by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, 
quickly grew to 169 pages after two weeks of intense negotiations between Congress and the 
Executive Branch. See David M. Herszenhorn, Talks on Bailout Plan Advance, Despite Anger and 
Skeptics in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A1; Mark Landler & Edmund L. Andrews, 
Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1. See 
discussion infra at notes 140–45. 
 122. Prentice & Spence, supra note 108, at 1907 (―SOX [Sarbanes-Oxley] was passed in a 
frenzy.‖); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 665 (―So rapidly was the package cobbled together 
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C. Constraints on Congress as a Corporate Regulator 
From a democratic perspective, Congress is the superior policymaking 
institution for corporate law when compared to states. Yet, significant 
structural and political constraints hamper its ability to attend consistently 
to important corporate regulatory matters.
123
 These intractable problems 
stem from the relationship between business and government and are 
exacerbated by increasing levels of dysfunction in the national political 
process. 
1. Theoretical Difficulties 
Political observers have long expressed concern about Congress‘s 
capability to competently regulate business affairs.
124
 Theorists have 
identified a number of constraints that seem to limit Congress‘s 
effectiveness in this realm. An early account by Charles Lindblom posited 
that these constraints emanate from the very structure of our political 
economy.
125
 Because private business interests play a dominant role in 
sustaining the economic prosperity of the nation, Congress and other 
regulators must always take account of industry concerns when setting 
public policy.
126
  
As Lindblom explains, in a private enterprise system it is business 
executives who control such economically significant decisions as the 
―nation‘s industrial technology, the pattern of work organization, location 
of industry, market structure, resource allocation, and, of course, executive 
compensation and status.‖127 Thus, ―in any private enterprise system, a 
large category of major decisions is turned over to businessmen.‖128 
Lindblom reasons that because of their authority over these central 
 
 
that little of its contents received much in the way of considered attention.‖). 
 123. There are no meaningful constitutional constraints on Congress‘s ability to regulate 
corporations. Arguments for Congressional restraint on federalism grounds typically are based on 
concepts of prudence rather than concerns regarding constitutional authority. See Mark J. Roe, 
Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 596–98 (2003). 
 124. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985); CHARLES E. 
LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 172–88 (1977).  
 125. LINDBLOM, supra note 124, at 172–88.  
 126. Id. at 171–74; see also Charles E. Lindblom, The Market as Prison, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
DEMOCRACY 275, 276–79 (Thomas Christiano ed., 2003); Prentice & Spence, supra note 108, at 
1846–48. 
 127. LINDBLOM, supra note 124, at 171. 
 128. Id. at 172. 
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functions, ―jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard of living, and the 
economic security of everyone‖ rest in the hands of businessmen.129  
It ineluctably follows that government officials cannot afford to be 
indifferent as to how business performs. Instead such officials must ―take 
action to secure the profitability and prosperity of the private sector: they 
are dependent upon the process of capital accumulation which they have 
for their own sake to maintain.‖130  
In Lindblom‘s view, ―a major function of government, therefore, is to 
see to it that businessmen perform their tasks.‖131 Business leaders are 
therefore accorded ―a privileged position in government.‖132 As Lindblom 
states, ―businessmen do not appear simply as representatives of a special 
interest‖ when they approach their government.133 Instead, ―[t]hey appear 
as functionaries performing functions that government officials regard as 
indispensable.‖134  
Some commentators view Lindblom‘s description of the role of 
business in government as simplistic.
135
 Political scientist Mark Smith 
questions the premises of Lindblom‘s account–in particular the 
assumption that when business unites on a policy issue it usually prevails 
in obtaining its desired outcome.
136
 He argues instead that when the 
business community does unify on a public policy issue, it will prevail 
only if the public‘s preferences coincide with those of business.137 As 
Smith explains, ―unifying issues are highly ideological and fit cleanly into 
the liberal-conservative dimension of political struggles.
‖138
 He argues that 
the ideological nature of these issues spurs politicians to assess and 
respond to public opinion when determining their policy positions. In 
Smith‘s view, therefore, businesses‘ success in promoting their preferred 
policy can be best attributed to broad public support for their objectives.
139
  
 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. HELD, supra note 30, at 206. 
 131. LINDBLOM, supra note 124, at 173. 
 132. Id. at 175. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. See MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER 143–66 (2000); Bratton 
& McCahery, supra note 63, at 655. 
 136. SMITH, supra note 135, at 4. 
 137. Id. at 8. 
 138. Id. at 21. 
 139. Id. at 10. Smith assesses the extent to which policy decisions favorable to business coincide 
with periods of economic prosperity or malaise—the assumption being that Congress will be more 
indulgent of business demands during downturns, as the imperative to foster economic recovery 
becomes acute. Id. at 149. Smith concludes, however, that ―[t]he historical record of lawmaking from 
1953 to 1996 provides little support for the strong or mild versions of the structuralist implications for 
  
 
 
 
 
2009] LEGITIMACY AND CORPORATE LAW 1305 
 
 
 
 
Despite the appearance of a core disagreement between Lindblom and 
Smith on the extent and impact of business‘s influence in politics, both 
appear to accept the existence of a strong identity of business interests 
with the public‘s interest in steady economic growth. It is this political 
reality that helps explain why business groups maintain so strong an 
influence over national policy. Business influence over corporate law 
policies is further amplified by general public apathy and the low political 
salience of corporate legal issues during times of relative economic 
prosperity.
140
 
Corporate law scholars seem to have settled on a descriptive account of 
the relationship between business and government that reflects Lindblom‘s 
structural perspective, but is qualified by insights offered by contemporary 
scholars such as Smith, John Kingdon and Stuart Banner. These scholars 
concur that business interests, represented by such groups as the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Investment Company 
Institute, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Business Roundtable 
enjoy a fair amount of political success in Congress during prosperous 
times (as denoted by rising stock markets). However, according to the 
received account, these interests can be shut out and neutralized during 
times of economic malaise when public attention to corporate issues 
intensifies.
141
  
Professors William Bratton and Roberta Romano both invoke John 
Kingdon‘s ―window‖ metaphor to help explain when conditions are ripe 
for major corporate reform legislation.
142
 Kingdon‘s description of 
agendas and policy windows finds support in the history of U.S. corporate 
regulation. Professor Stuart Banner has documented a consistent pattern in 
 
 
representation.‖ Id. at 160. Instead, he found that ―[r]esponsiveness by members of Congress and 
presidents to public opinion does not happen only when prosperity allows it; responsiveness is a 
continuing process, persisting through good and bad economic times.‖ Id. at 159. 
 140. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 674, 676; SMITH, supra note 135, at 27–28 (salience 
creates incentives for elected officials to respond to voter preferences).  
 141. Romano, supra note 101, at 1591–94; Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 661–69; Roe, 
supra note 96, at 2529; Prentice & Spence, supra note 108, at 1846–51; see also ANNE M. 
KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 26–27 
(1992) (describing business interests‘ political weakness after the Great Depression, which facilitated 
the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933).  
 142. Romano, supra note 101, at 1523–26; Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 667. 
According to Kingdon, a policy window opens for new policy initiatives only sporadically. JOHN W. 
KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 166 (2d ed. 1995). Windows open 
because of a change in the political stream (a change in administration, a shift in national mood) or 
because a new problem emerges, often upon the occurrence of a dramatic external event. Id. at 166–
70. When a policy window opens, policy entrepreneurs seize the opportunity to put forward their 
favored solutions to the perceived problem. Id. at 179–82. These solutions are often policies that have 
been floating around for a while, waiting for a problem to arise to latch onto. Id. at 183. 
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which securities reform legislation follows serious financial downturns.
143
 
This history suggests that the policy window opens for the favored reform 
initiatives of corporate governance ―entrepreneurs‖ only upon the rare 
confluence of an economic downturn, falling stock markets, and corporate 
or political scandal.
144
 Only in such political-economic conditions do 
corporate law issues attain the salience that spurs public demand for 
Congressional action. Although corporate commentators strongly dispute 
the substantive merits of the resulting legislation, they seem to agree about 
the strength of the influence of business leaders over the national 
regulatory process during times of relative prosperity and the conditions 
necessary to bring about the neutralization of such power.
145
 
2. Congressional Dysfunction 
Federal policymakers rely heavily on business leaders to oversee and 
manage our country‘s economic health. Government cannot compel, but 
must instead cajole, businesses to adopt desirable policies with respect to 
such basic economic fundamentals as investment, employment, 
production, and prices. Considering the key role business leaders play in 
fostering economic growth, politicians must be highly sensitive to their 
demands and concerns.
146
 
This political bind may be more acute than Lindblom suspected given 
recent evidence of the extent to which corruption has infected the national 
political process.
147
 In the era of modern political campaigns, national 
 
 
 143. Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (―[M]ost of the major instances of new securities regulation . . . have come 
right after [stock market] crashes.‖). 
 144. A counter-cycle seems to exist in which the policy window for deregulatory corporate 
measures opens during times of sustained economic prosperity and bull markets (i.e., bubbles). See 
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 671–73 (discussing business‘s legislative success during the 
1990s bull market, including enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the National 
Securities Market Improvement Act and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act); Renee M. 
Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 107, 113–14 (2005) (describing the retrenchment trend in securities enforcement). 
 145. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 666–68; Romano, supra note 101, at 1591–94; 
Prentice & Spence, supra note 108, at 1847–49, 1908; Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1588–89 
(―High-profile scandals can shift the balance of power both in Congress and, derivatively, at the SEC, 
by triggering a deep, populist theme in American politics and energizing broad, loosely organized 
constituencies.‖).  
 146. The recent financial bailout legislation is yet another a stark example of this political co-
dependency. In October 2008, Congress adopted emergency legislation to authorize up to $700 billion 
in spending to rescue major U.S. financial institutions threatened with collapse. See Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 147. The Jack Abramoff saga is emblematic of the extent to which corruption can distort the 
democratic process. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
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politicians must raise enormous sums of money to win elections and stay 
in office.
148
 The need to constantly replenish campaign coffers makes 
national politicians highly sensitive to the interests of business leaders, a 
key source of these contributions.
149
 Corporations also use their vast 
resources to influence public opinion, shaping perceptions of business 
even before salient political issues emerge.
150
 
Legislators‘ dependence on the largesse of corporate officials impedes 
their ability to objectively assess policy proposals that affect the interests 
of their benefactors. Furthermore, lobbyists have come to command a 
greater degree of control over legislation than the idealized deliberative 
account admits.
151
 The influence of lobbyists and major contributors in 
Congress has created an environment that can make the type of reasoned 
 
 
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 179–91 (2006) (describing the 
role of lobbyists in Washington and the K Street project). 
 148. As examples, the most expensive Senate race in 2006, run by former Senator Hillary Clinton 
of New York, cost nearly $47 million. The most expensive race for the House cost $11 million. Center 
for Responsive Politics, Most Expensive Races, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/topraces.php? 
cycle=2006&display=allcands (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). The average cost of a successful Senate 
campaign in 2006 was $9,635,370, while the average successful House campaign cost $1,253,031. 
Center for Responsive Politics, Election Stats, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php? 
cycle=2006 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). Similarly, the costs of a Presidential campaign have soared. 
President Barack Obama spent almost $730 million in his presidential campaign, compared to $333 
million spent by Senator John McCain. Center for Responsive Politics, Banking on Becoming 
President, http://www.opensecrets.corg/pres08/index.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). Although 
President Obama‘s fundraising prowess was unprecedented, it differed in some respects from 
traditional fundraising for national campaigns because he commanded a large base of small 
contributors. The Obama campaign reported receiving donations from more than three million 
individual contributors with an average contribution of less than $100. See Michael Luo, Obama’s 
September Success Recasts the Fund-Raising Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at A21.  
 149. Interest groups spent $2.8 billion to lobby federal government officials in 2007. Center for 
Responsive Politics, Lobbying Top Spenders, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2009). Campaign contributions and lobbying were also a contributing factor in the savings 
and loan crisis and the Enron scandal. For detailed reports on the influence of political contributions 
and corporate lobbying on Congress and other government officials, see Michael Waldman, The S&L 
Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, 2 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 47, 55 (1990) (―[T]he S&L 
debacle . . . is a crisis of the way politics and business interact in the late twentieth century.‖); Albert 
R. Hunt, Enron’s One Good Return: Political Investments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2002, at A19; Jill E. 
Fisch, How do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) 
(describing how FedEx Corporation used its political influence to effect desired deregulation in the 
transportation industry). 
 150. SMITH, supra note 135, at 32 (describing the role of conservative think tanks in shaping 
public opinion of the role of business in government). 
 151. SINCLAIR, supra note 99, at 115. During the legislative push for the Contract with America in 
1995, ―Republicans gave [business] groups unusually intimate access to the legislative process at the 
pre-floor stage, even allowing lobbyists to draft provisions of the legislation.‖ Id. As Sinclair reports it, 
―[e]very Thursday morning Rep. John A. Boehner of Ohio, chair of the Republican Conference, met 
with a large group of lobbyists, including representatives of Project Relief and of the Alliance for 
Reasonable Regulation, another similar coalition. The purpose of the meetings was to coordinate the 
groups‘ lobbying and grass-roots campaigns for the Contract [with America].‖ Id. at 116. 
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substantive debate that deliberative democrats favor unduly idealistic.
152
 
When we factor in further political realities, such as divided government 
and heightened partisanship, it becomes increasingly challenging for 
legislators to work together to craft the kind of legislation that reflects 
deliberative democratic values.
153
  
D. Congress’s Pragmatic Posture—Delegation to the SEC 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, Congress‘s ability to regulate 
corporations and markets is hampered by inherent structural limitations 
and more base political realities. Congress manages these constraints by 
deferring broadly to state authority, intervening in corporate matters only 
when compelled by a financial crisis or populist rancor brought on by 
corporate scandal.
154
 Congress‘s tradition of deference to state regulation 
can thus be viewed as a conditional grant of authority.
155
 When corporate 
governance problems arise that threaten the national economy, Congress 
stands ready to intervene, adopting a more assertive regulatory approach 
than that favored by the states.
156
 Between these episodic crises, Congress 
relies on a dual strategy of delegation and deference. During tranquil 
periods, the SEC (and SROs) are charged with responding to the more 
modest disruptions in the markets related to corporate governance.  
Congressional delegation to agency authority solves a number of 
political dilemmas.
157
 Members of Congress lack the time, inclination, and 
 
 
 152. See id. at 227–30 (discussing the negative impact of ―unorthodox lawmaking‖ on the quality 
of deliberation in Congress). 
 153. See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in 
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 620–22 (2006). Lazarus asserts that Congress‘s increased 
reliance on the appropriations process to pursue policy initiatives has led to a much less transparent 
approach to environmental legislation, which has given more influence to special interests and resulted 
in ad hoc, balkanized policies. See also Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The 
Decline of Deliberative Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
321, 322, 369 (1994). Another problematic trend is the practice of attaching riders and amendments to 
popular legislation without proper vetting by the substantive committees. See Edward R. Becker, Of 
Laws and Sausages, 87 JUDICATURE 7, 7–9 (2003) (giving examples of how the procedural rules of the 
House of Representatives are frequently ignored in practice). This practice allows new policies to be 
enshrined into federal law without so much as an explanation, hearing, or debate. Id. 
 154. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 661 (describing Congress‘s occasional regulatory 
forays, including FCPA and Sarbanes-Oxley, as a ―fire patrol.‖). 
 155. See Roe, supra note 96, at 2530–35 (analogizing Delaware to a federal agency subject to 
Congressional oversight); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 63, at 693 (same). 
 156. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 8, at 628–29; Roe, supra note 123, at 600–07. 
 157. KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 16, 56 (4th ed. 
2004) (describing the political considerations compelling the creation of independent administrative 
agencies); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 99 (1985) (―Administrators at least operate within a set of legal rules 
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expertise to oversee the increasingly complex financial markets that 
overwhelmingly influence the health of our economy. Congress 
prudentially delegates administrative authority to agencies, while retaining 
the power and responsibility to set broad policy parameters and monitor 
their implementation through the exercise of oversight.  
1. The Rationale for Delegation 
Agencies are widely viewed to be better suited to administrative tasks 
than the legislature due to institutional qualities such as professionalism, 
administrative expertise, subject-matter expertise, and experience.
158
 At 
least until recently, the SEC has been consistently rated as one of the best 
performing administrative agencies.
159
 Its staff enjoyed a reputation as 
committed public servants who strived to remain above politics and sought 
to base decisions on the law and conventions of legal reasoning.
160
 The 
 
 
(administrative law) that keep them within their jurisdiction, require them to operate with a modicum 
of explanation and participation of the affected interests, police them for consistency, and protect them 
from the importuning of congressmen and others who would like to carry logrolling into the 
administrative process.‖). 
 158. Mashaw, supra note 157, at 99; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive 
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 579 (2002) (―The agency‘s 
career staff provide an ongoing repository not only of substantive knowledge but also of decision 
making experience so that agencies . . . need not reinvent the wheel every four or eight years.‖); see 
also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET xix (3d ed. 2003).  
 159. KHADEMIAN, supra note 141, at 9. See BILLY RAY HALL, JR., A LEGAL SOLUTION TO 
GOVERNMENT GRIDLOCK: THE ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 5–6 (1998).  
 The SEC‘s reputation has suffered badly as a result of the financial crisis and other major 
scandals. Former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has been singled out for criticism. Kara Scannell & 
Susanne Craig, SEC Chief Under Fire as Fed Seeks Bigger Wall Street Role—Cox Draws Criticism for 
Low-Key Leadership During Bear Crisis, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2008, at A1. According to his critics, 
there has been a let up in enforcement vigor during Cox‘s term. Id. In addition, the SEC has been seen 
as adopting more pro-management positions, and has proposed policies that would erode U.S. 
accounting standards. Id. Cox has also been criticized for his passivity in the face of the emerging Wall 
Street debacle. Former SEC Chair Levitt Says Lax Oversight Helped Create Financial Crisis, 40 SEC. 
REG. & L. REPT. 1682, Oct. 20, 2008. For a more extensive discussion of the SEC‘s regulatory 
failures, see Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392284). 
 Many of SEC‘s recent problems have been attributed to leadership failure. Cox exhibited hostility 
to the agency‘s mission often siding with industry over investors in securities law disputes, and 
implementing new policies that hampered enforcement efforts and undermined staff morale. See U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Securities & Exchange Commission, Greater Attention Needed to 
Enhance Communication and Utilization Resources in the Division of Enforcement, March 2009, at 7–
8 (describing the enforcement division attorney‘s frustration with the SEC‘s new penalty policies). 
Although these observations detract from the case for enhancing SEC independence, from a broader 
perspective, greater independence over the long-term could have equipped the SEC to adopt policies 
that would better withstand efforts of a hostile administration to weaken its effectiveness.  
 160. KHADEMIAN, supra note 141, at 89–93; BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
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agency‘s adherence to a consistent mission and mode of regulation helped 
contribute to its perceived legitimacy among investors and the parties that 
it regulates.
161
  
This agency expertise is a compelling rationale for deference, yet it is 
insufficient to justify Congress‘s long-standing practice of broad 
delegation of authority to agencies.
162
 If competence and expertise are the 
main objectives, Congress could conceivably retain such expertise within 
its own domain. The justification for agency authority must therefore rest 
on firmer ground; the value of democratic deliberation provides a stronger 
rationale for this tradition of delegation.  
Delegation to agencies enhances the quality of democratic deliberation 
in the policymaking process.
163
 Rulemaking procedures prescribed for 
administrative agencies, including the SEC, square well with the 
democratic values.
164
 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
165
 and 
other constraints on agencies instill deliberation, participation, 
transparency, and accountability into the rulemaking process. These 
requirements help to ensure that agency rulemaking is subject to public 
scrutiny and careful review from the executive branch, Congress, and 
affected parties.  
2. The SEC as Rulemaker 
Several factors contribute to the SEC‘s ability to satisfy many of the 
demands of deliberative democracy. First, the SEC benefits from a degree 
of political independence that helps insulate it from the raw political 
pressures that limit Congress‘s ability to actively manage corporate law 
policy.
166
 By law, the SEC‘s five commissioners are appointed by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve for staggered 
five-year terms.
167
 No more than three of the five commissioners can be 
from the same political party.
168
 This mandated political balance helps 
 
 
REGULATORY POLICY 62 (6th ed. 2006); HALL, supra note 148, at 11–13.  
 161. KHADEMIAN, supra note 141, at 84–88; SELIGMAN, supra note 158, at 619–21. 
 162. See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED 
STATES 92–126 (2d ed. 1979). 
 163. See Seidenfeld, supra note 20, at 1515–16 (―[T]he civic republican conception [provides] an 
essential justification for the modern bureaucratic state.‖); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a 
Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 802 (2006).  
 164. Seidenfeld, supra note 20, at 1559–60. 
 165. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2000). 
 166. See discussion supra Part III.C; WARREN, supra note 157, at 16. 
 167. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000). 
 168. Id.  
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support deliberative decision making and serves as an antidote to the 
phenomenon of ―groupthink‖ that can hinder group decision making 
processes.
169
  
The SEC flexes its administrative muscle principally through its 
rulemaking power.
170
 It exercises authority under six federal securities 
statutes including the Securities Act of 1933 (the ―Securities Act‖)171 and 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the ―Exchange Act‖).172 Under 
these statutes, the SEC enjoys broad discretion to adopt regulations to 
fulfill its Congressional mandate.
173
 Additional corporate oversight is 
provided by the SROs, which by statute operate under SEC supervision.
174
 
 
 
 169. See Jones, supra note 114, at 140–41; James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the 
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91–99 (1985) (discussing how powerful ingroup bias is created in the 
boardroom) (1985); see also Marleen A. O‘Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1257–93 (2003) (providing a case study of how the Enron Board may have been 
affected by ―groupthink‖). 
 170. The SEC also relies heavily on enforcement as an administrative tool. See The State of the 
Securities Market: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), 
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ACF1CA4.pdf (discussing the recent activities of 
the SEC Enforcement Division). It sometimes uses enforcement actions to establish new policies, but 
more frequently does so to ensure compliance with existing policies. See generally ROBERTA KARMEL, 
REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. CORPORATE 
AMERICA (1982). The SEC‘s practice of policymaking through enforcement has garnered criticism 
from observers. See generally id.; Jonathan Macey, Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: 
Corporations and Capital Markets, 115 YALE L.J. 2416, 2440 (2006).  
 171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–z, 77aa (2000). 
 172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000). The SEC also exercises jurisdiction over the Trust Indenture 
Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb (2000); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 80a–1 to 80a–64 (2000); the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b–1 to 80b–21 
(2000); and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). The SEC was responsible for administering the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 until that Act was repealed in 2005. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z, 79z–
1 to 79z–6 (repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594).  
 173. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.2 (2008) (providing an overview of the SEC‘s statutory functions).  
 174. New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq listing standards provide more in the way of 
substantive governance requirements than state corporate law. Compare NYSE, Rules 496–501A, 
Listing and Delisting, available at http://rules.nyse.com/nyse/nyse_rules (follow ―Listing and 
Delisting‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 21, 2009), and NASDAQ, LISTING STANDARDS & FEES 21–24 
(Dec. 2008), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf (last visited Feb. 
21, 2009) with 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. § 141(a)–(k). Listing standards address such central 
governance issues as shareholder voting rights, board composition, board committee requirements and 
shareholder voice in mergers. See NYSE, Rules 496–501A, supra; NASDAQ, LISTING STANDARDS & 
FEES, supra, at 21–24. The SROs also play an important role in disciplining members, issuers, brokers, 
and dealers through rulemaking, investigations and disciplinary procedures. See, e.g., New York Stock 
Exchange, Disciplinary Rules (475–77), available at http://rules.nyse.com/nyse/nyse_rules (last visited 
May 12, 2009) (follow ―Disciplinary Rules‖ hyperlink); NASDAQ, Investigations and Sanctions 
(8000–8300), available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/NASDAQ/Main/. In 2007, the NASD merged with 
the regulatory arm of the NYSE to form a new SRO, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, also 
known as FINRA. New York Stock Exchange, Disciplinary Rules (475–77), available at 
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Although the SROs have the freedom to craft their own rules, such rules 
are subject to SEC approval, after notice and comment, before becoming 
effective.
175
 
Each securities statute confers upon the SEC the power to adopt rules 
that carry the force of law.
176
 Such rulemaking power is generally referred 
to as legislative rulemaking, as a rule adopted under this authority can be 
enforced in the same manner as a statute adopted by Congress.
177
  
Minimum standards for rulemaking by federal agencies are set forth in 
the APA.
178
 Legislative rules are adopted under the ―notice and comment‖ 
rulemaking rubric, which requires the agency to give general notice of the 
proposed regulation including the legal basis for the rule, a description of 
the rule, and an explanation of the issues involved, in the Federal 
Register.
179
 The agency must afford interested parties the opportunity for 
public comment through ―submission of written data, views, or arguments 
with or without opportunity for oral presentation.‖180 After giving 
consideration to the views and evidence presented, the agency reviews the 
 
 
http://rules.nyse.com/nyse/nyse_rules (last visited May 12, 2009) (follow ―Disciplinary Rules‖ 
hyperlink). 
 175. Securities Exchange Act § 19; 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000). The importance of these deliberative 
protections makes current proposals to streamline—or short-circuit—the SEC‘s role in approving SRO 
rules unappealing from a democratic perspective. See DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 4, at 111–15 
(proposing to expedite the SRO rules approval system and to make more SRO rules effective upon 
filing). 
 176. Various sections of the securities statutes give rules the force of law. See, e.g., Exchange Act 
§ 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78(w) (2000) (―The Commission . . . shall . . . have power to make such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter for 
which they are responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in them by this chapter.‖); 17 
C.F.R. 200.1–220.2 (2008) (describing the statutory functions and authority of the Commission). The 
SEC can also issue interpretive rules and statements of policy—or non-legislative rules—that are often 
issued to the public as ―SEC Releases.‖ These interpretative rules are exempt from the APA‘s 
procedures for notice and comment rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3(A) (2000); 1 THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.4[2] (4th ed. 2002). Examples of non-
legislative rules include ―safe harbor‖ rules that provide objective criteria that investors can use to 
determine whether or not they qualify for statutory exemptions. See, e.g., Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.147 (2008) (safe harbor provision for the intrastate offering exemption); Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.144 (2008) (safe harbor provision for the definition of ―underwriter.‖); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.506 (2008) (safe harbor provision for a private offering exemption). Even more informal 
methods of policy making include the interpretative releases, staff legal bulletins, and no-action letters. 
For further discussion of the practice and import of these informal policy pronouncements, see Donna 
M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current 
Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 929–33 (1998) (describing in detail 
the SEC rulemaking and adjudicatory powers).  
 177. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:8 (2d ed. 1979); 1 THOMAS 
LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.4[2][A] (4th ed. 2002). 
 178. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2000). 
 179. Id. § 553(b). 
 180. Id. § 553(c). 
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record de novo before publishing its final rule accompanied by a statement 
of reasons.
181
 The APA‘s mandates are supplemented by the SEC‘s 
enabling acts and its own procedural rules.
182
 The Exchange Act, for 
example, requires the SEC to consider whether the rule being promulgated 
―promote[s] efficiency, competition, and capital formation.‖183 These 
procedural protections help to ensure that the public is well-informed of an 
agency‘s policy proposals and has an opportunity to respond with 
objections, suggestions, and concerns.
184
 The process also encourages the 
SEC to justify its rulemaking by giving reasons for its policies and 
responding to the concerns of those who are affected by them.  
The SEC often goes beyond the letter of these requirements by seeking 
public participation and dialogue through town-hall meetings and public 
hearings, and by establishing special committees and advisory groups to 
study particular issues.
185
 SEC Commissioners and staff also regularly 
 
 
 181. Id.; TOM C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT 31–32 (1973).  
 182. See SEC Rules of Practice Rule 192, 17 C.F.R. § 201.192 (2008). 
 183. Exchange Act § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2000). The Investment Company Act contains an 
analogous requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)–2c (2000). Other federal statutes create additional 
rulemaking burdens. For example, under the Congressional Review Act agencies face reporting 
requirements which aim to facilitate Congressional review of new federal regulation. Congressional 
Review Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2000) (requiring agencies to submit cost-benefit analysis, 
regulatory flexibility analysis and analysis pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995). 
Likewise, the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to analyze the effects of proposed new rules 
on small businesses, and to review and re-evaluate regulations. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2000). The 
Paperwork Reduction Act creates further informational and publication burdens on agencies 
promulgating new rules. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (2000).  
 Some scholars have criticized these additional procedural burdens for having a chilling effect on 
notice and comment rulemaking. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, 
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1311, 1379 (1992) (arguing that agencies should adhere to Congressionally prescribed notice and 
comment rulemaking despite the fact that such procedures ―can levy upon limited agency funds, 
people, and other resources.‖); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ―Deossifying‖ the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386–95 (1992) (discussing the ossification of informal 
rulemaking and pointing out that recent evidence suggests ―that agencies are beginning to seek out 
alternative, less participatory regulatory vehicles to circumvent the increasingly stiff and formalized 
structures of the informal rulemaking process.‖). These scholars argue that legislatively-imposed 
procedures are too burdensome for most agencies, causing them to circumvent the deliberative 
process. See, e.g., Anthony, supra, at 1379; McGarity, supra, at 1386–95. For a related discussion on 
the deleterious effects of judicially imposed procedural burdens, see infra Part IV.A.2. 
 184. See WARREN, supra note 157, at 269 (―Rulemaking is comprehensible, relatively quick, and 
democratically accountable, especially in the sense that decision making is kept above board and equal 
access is provided to all.‖). 
 185. Recent examples include roundtable discussions and task forces formed to study mutual fund 
board independence requirements and hedge fund regulation. See The State of the Securities Market, 
supra note 170; Oversight Hearing on Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: Hearing Before the H. Sub. 
Comm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Lori A. Richards, 
Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
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engage with the public through speeches, articles and ―SEC Speaks‖ 
seminars at which staff members and commissioners discuss the agency‘s 
regulatory agenda.
186
 
3. Agency Accountability 
Although it enjoys broad regulatory discretion, the SEC remains 
accountable to the executive, Congress, and the courts.
187
 The President 
exerts control over the direction of SEC policy by nominating new 
commissioners when vacancies arise and, more importantly, by selecting 
the chair who in turn selects the senior staff and controls the regulatory 
agenda.
188
 Although the President lacks authority to remove a sitting 
commissioner without cause, he can designate a new chair at any time.
189
  
Like the President, Congress has a myriad of tools available to 
influence SEC policy.
190
 Oversight committees can summon the chair or 
senior staff to express disapproval of a policy position or a failure to 
address a perceived problem.
191
 Congress also controls the agency‘s 
budget, and committee chairs can use this power to press their policy 
 
 
Commission); available at http://www.investorscoalition.com/judrichardsjune705.pdf; Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Opening Remarks at the SEC Roundtable on 
the Role of Independent Investment Company Directors (Feb. 23, 1999), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch253.htm. The SEC also held roundtable discussions as it 
considered adopting shareholder access proposals. Agenda for Proxy Process Roundtable, May 7, 
2007, Roundtable Discussions Regarding the Proxy Process, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy 
process/proxyagenda-050707.htm. 
 186. Prentice, supra note 163, at 801–02. 
 187. KHADEMIAN, supra note 141, at 3 (describing the tension between expertise and 
accountability in administrative bureaucracies). 
 188. 17 C.F.R. 200.10 (2007); Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, § 3, 64 Stat. 1265 (1950); 
ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 49–59 (1997); 
Macey, supra note 170, at 2432–33.  
 189. See Humphrey‘s Ex‘r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The new chair can be another 
sitting commissioner or a new appointee if a vacancy exists. The administration can also turn to the 
President‘s Working Group on Financial Markets (―President‘s Working Group‖) to guide agency 
policy. See PRESIDENT‘S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON 
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 11–12, 19–20 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/ 
releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf. The President‘s Working Group acts as an 
inter-agency coordinator for financial regulation and provides the President an additional source of 
influence over financial regulation, including regulations provided under the auspices of the SEC. Id. 
For example, in March 2008, the President‘s Working Group released a policy statement on the origins 
of the financial market ―turmoil‖ and made several recommendations, including reforming the 
mortgage origination process and enhancing prudential regulatory policies. Id. 
 190. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND 
MAKE POLICY 213–26 (3d ed. 2003); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political 
Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1075–78 (2001). 
 191. Seidenfeld, supra note 190, at 1077–78. 
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preferences or those of their favored constituencies.
192
 In addition, 
Congress can amend statutes or adopt new laws to compel or forbid 
certain policies.
193
  
Finally, the SEC is accountable to courts. Private citizens can sue the 
agency to challenge final agency orders and rules that run afoul of its 
statutory mandate or prescribed regulatory procedures.
194
 Disgruntled 
interest groups often initiate such suits when dissatisfied with the outcome 
of the rulemaking process.
195
 
4. The Realities of Rulemaking 
Significant SEC rules typically evoke hundreds (sometimes thousands) 
of comment letters.
196
 These comment letters are accepted electronically 
and posted on the SEC website, enhancing the transparency and 
accessibility of SEC rulemaking.
197
 Due to the specialized nature of the 
rules, business interests tend to dominate public comments on agency 
rules.
198
 However, a significant number of comment letters received by the 
SEC are submitted by individual investors and other citizens with an 
interest in SEC policy.
199
 Academics sometimes weigh in with their views 
 
 
 192. See Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: Government’s Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 286, 294–96; ARTHUR LEVITT WITH PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET 131–33 (2002); 
SELIGMAN, supra note 158, at 712–28. 
 193. For example, many Sarbanes-Oxley provisions direct the SEC to adopt statutorily prescribed 
rules and to conduct studies on various regulatory matters. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 307, 15 U.S.C 
§ 7245 (2000); §§ 701–705 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000). This form of political accountability can be a 
double-edged sword as interest groups can bypass the agency‘s deliberative process to lobby the 
President or Congress to constrain the SEC from adopting policies they oppose. See, e.g., LEVITT, 
supra note 192, at 10–12 (describing corporate lobbyists‘ efforts to thwart SEC policy proposals). 
 194. Securities Exchange Act § 25(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a), (b) (2000); 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706 
(2000); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
 195. See infra text accompanying notes 258–302. 
 196. Prentice, supra note 163, at 802. 
 197. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, How to Submit Comments on SEC Rulemaking, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). Some question the impact 
of electronic rulemaking on the extent or quality of public participation in rulemaking. See Cary 
Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 949–
52 (2006) (discussing how, prior to e-rulemaking, few comments to agencies came from ordinary 
citizens). 
 198. Marissa Marino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-making Process: Who Participates? 
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 245, 252–53 (1998) (noting that 
business interests dominate rulemaking). 
 199. David C. Nixon et al., With Friends Like These: Rule-making Comment Submissions to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN RESEARCH & THEORY 59, 64 (2002) (finding 
that individuals submitted a large percentage of comments on two significant SEC rules in 1998); see 
also Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414 
(2005) (finding that comments from the lay public make up the vast majority of total comments for 
some regulations).  
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on various SEC proposals and policies either individually or in groups.
200
 
In choosing to adopt, defer, or abandon a final rule, the SEC appears to 
take the views of commenters seriously.
201
 Comments are acknowledged 
and directly addressed in the final rules releases.
202
 
The rulemaking record for Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), which was 
adopted in 2000, illustrates how public participation in SEC rulemaking 
can be both broad and substantial.
203
 Regulation FD was a priority of then-
SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, and was adopted to curb the practice of 
selective disclosure of material financial information to securities analysts 
and institutional investors. The SEC received 6,000 comment letters on 
Regulation FD.
204
 A majority of the letters were from individual investors 
who strongly supported the rule. On the other side of the ledger, comments 
from securities industry groups were decidedly negative.
205
 These 
commenters insisted the rule would chill disclosure and ―choke‖ the flow 
of information to investors.
206
 Despite strong industry opposition, the 
proposed rule was adopted by the Commission, with modifications that 
took into account some of the commenters‘ concerns.207 
As the preceding example demonstrates, the SEC‘s rulemaking process 
often accords well with the ideals of deliberative democracy. 
Unfortunately, however, the process does not always proceed in such a 
principled manner. Just as Congress faces real constraints on its regulatory 
flexibility, a number of worrisome factors constrain the SEC as well.  
 
 
 200. Recent examples include a letter from law professors encouraging the SEC to adopt a rule 
regarding professional responsibilities of lawyers practicing before the commission. Letter from 
Richard Painter, Prof., Univ. of Minn. et al., to Harvey Pitt, Chairperson, Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n 
(Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/pitt.pdf. In 2007, a 
group of law professors submitted a comment letter on the SEC‘s competing ―shareholder access‖ 
proposals. Comment Letter of thirty-nine Law Professors in Favor of Placing Shareholder-Proposed 
Bylaw Amendments on the Corporate Ballot, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec‘y, Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n 
(Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-119.pdf. 
 201. Nixon et al., supra note 199, at 65; see also Cuellar, supra note 199, at 414 (agencies react to 
the notice and comment process by making changes in their proposed rules); KERWIN, supra note 190, 
at 202 (describing how seriously agencies take public comments). 
 202. Nixon et al., supra note 199, at 65 (―[F]ailure to adequately acknowledge or respond to a 
comment is grounds for judicial appeal . . . .‖) (emphasis omitted); KHADEMIAN, supra note 141, at 
101–06 (describing public participation during the SEC‘s one share-one vote rulemaking process); see 
also Cuellar, supra note 199, at 460 (―[A]gencies respond to the comments they get by making 
changes in their proposed rule.‖).  
 203. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7,881, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599 65 Fed. Reg. 51,738 (Aug. 24, 
2000). 
 204. SELIGMAN, supra note 158, at 654. 
 205. LEVITT, supra note 192, at 93. 
 206. Id. at 94–95. 
 207. Id. 
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Undoubtedly, the SEC and its staff are susceptible to the influence of 
the well-funded, organized interest groups that are repeat players before 
the agency.
208
 The agency is also influenced by a law-centered culture that 
tends to favor complex solutions to market problems.
209
 The possibility of 
securing lucrative employment opportunities may also encourage staff 
members to favor opaque practices and standards that confer professional 
advantages to former SEC staffers and others with good contacts within 
the agency.
210
  
The apparent influence of private interest groups on SEC policies has 
led some commentators to conclude that the agency has been ―captured‖ 
and reduced to the menial task of doling out private rents to lawyers and 
interest groups, instead of regulating in the public interest.
211
 Less cynical 
observers view the SEC as managing disputes among competing industry 
groups, rather than consistently serving a monolithic corporate interest.
212
 
Most academic assessments of the agency‘s history conclude that the 
agency has avoided capture.
213
 The agency‘s culture, which has been 
guided by a consistent regulatory philosophy, provides a better 
 
 
 208. See Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation 
of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 
972 (2005) (―[T]he SEC [is] an important vehicle through which interest groups sustain and even 
extend the political victories they have won in Congress.‖); see also Jonathan R. Macey, 
Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 922 (1994) [hereinafter Macey, Agency Obsolescence] (―The predictable 
phenomenon of agency ‗capture‘ by special interest groups has led to subsidies to favored 
constituencies, particularly securities analysts, institutional investors, market professionals (traders and 
market makers) and retail brokerage firms.‖). 
 209. See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A 
PURPOSE 18–20 (1979). Some observers speculate that lawyers‘ dominance at the agency may be 
responsible for its preference for complexity in the law, as complexity increases the value of lawyers‘ 
specialized services and expertise in the legal market. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 1604–07. 
The pattern of movement by senior staff between private law firms and the SEC is another factor that 
some speculate spurs the agency to continue to create newer and more complex rules. Id. 
 210. A recent report from the Inspector General of the SEC found that a common practice exists 
within the SEC of ―giving outside lawyers‘ clients access to high level SEC Officials.‖ Walt 
Bogdanich, Impartiality of SEC is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 7, 2008, at B1; Memorandum from H. 
David Kotz, Inspector General, Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. and 
Exch. Comm‘n, Re-Investigation of Claims by Gary Aguirre of Improper Preferential Treatment and 
Retaliatory Termination (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/ 
prg100708.pdf. 
 211. Macey, Agency Obsolescence, supra note 208, at 948 (describing turf-grabbing and capture 
as the agency‘s modus operandi); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal 
Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 972–78 (2001); Pritchard, supra note 4, at 1099–
1100 (summarizing the capture account).  
 212. SELIGMAN, supra note 158, at xix–xx; KHADEMIAN, supra note 141, at 13–16.  
 213. SELIGMAN, supra note 158, at xix; Prentice, supra note 163, at 801. 
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explanation for the agency‘s policy approach than a simplistic capture 
story.  
Of larger concern than the risk of capture is the reality that despite the 
strong legislative mandate for an open and inclusive rulemaking process, 
there can be no assurance that publicly-oriented concerns will actually 
influence agency policy.
214
 Commissioners can ignore public comments 
and proceed as they intended all along.
215
 Alternatively, the agency might 
heed the concerns and preferences of a favored group to the detriment of 
others.
216
 Such favoritism can be easily disguised as deliberative reason 
giving—allowing the SEC to comply with the ritual of the deliberation, 
while evading its spirit.
217
 
E. Relative Advantages of Federal Rulemaking 
Despite unavoidable flaws in the SEC‘s rulemaking procedures, SEC 
regulation offers a number of advantages over legislation and judicial 
decision making at the state and federal levels. When practiced in its ideal 
form, SEC rulemaking is based on reasons, accessible to the public, 
transparent, and subject to accountability to the executive, Congress, and 
the courts. The SEC‘s rulemaking procedure is also flexible and 
responsive.
218
 The agency regularly reviews its rules and can revise 
problematic rules and reconsider proposals that were tabled in the past due 
to a failure to achieve consensus.
219
 
IV. THE DEMOCRATIC CASE FOR BROAD SEC AUTHORITY 
Congress‘s tradition of broad delegation to the SEC helps protect 
democratic ideals. Delegation empowers the agency to address promptly 
 
 
 214. See Golden, supra note 198, at 259–62 (finding that one of the ten rules studied was changed 
―a great deal‖ in response to public comments); KERWIN, supra note 190, at 202–07 (reviewing mixed 
evidence of the influence of public comments on agency rules). 
 215. See, e.g., Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2002); Golden, supra note 198, at 261 (―When there is 
conflict rather than consensus among the commenters . . . the agency tends to hear most clearly the 
voices that support the agency‘s position.‖). 
 216. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 158, at 588 (―There is little chance that compulsory 
exposure to other points of view during the policymaking process will redeem an agency that has sold 
out to an interest group.‖). 
 217. Id. 
 218. KERWIN, supra note 190, at 30. 
 219. Id. at 28–36. ―One of the great advantages of rulemaking by agencies is their ability to 
respond in a timely manner to unanticipated and changed conditions, and most especially 
emergencies.‖ Id. at 30. 
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those corporate law problems that arise during extended periods when 
Congress is politically disabled, due to disinterest or dysfunction, from 
taking appropriate action.
220
 During these prolonged periods of 
Congressional passivity, it is the SEC that supplies a democratic 
counterweight to the more insular corporate lawmaking processes 
embraced by the states. In this way, the SEC‘s delegated authority 
mitigates some of the shortcomings of the states‘ regulatory practices.  
Because the SEC performs a critical role in supporting our corporate 
regulatory structure, it seems essential that its authority and flexibility be 
respected and protected by its counterparts in government. Judicial respect 
for a broad conception of SEC authority should be seen as a necessary 
element in protecting the stability of the corporate governance structure. 
Although many scholars urge courts to vigilantly constrain the scope of 
SEC authority, the values of deliberative democracy command the 
opposite approach. 
A. Balancing Independence with Democratic Accountability 
There is an unavoidable tension in seeking to protect the independence 
necessary to buffer the SEC from persistent political pressure, while 
adequately respecting the democratic principle of accountability.
221
 
Society has managed this tension by creating political and procedural 
mechanisms to hold administrative agencies accountable to each of the 
constitutional branches of government: the legislature, the executive, and 
the courts. The challenge for society lies in affording the agency sufficient 
flexibility to overcome the political constraints that sometimes hamper the 
legislature‘s effectiveness. 
Judicial review of agency rulemaking is a key component of the system 
of checks and balances that helps ensure that bureaucracies remain 
accountable to the public. Yet, administrative law scholars have expressed 
serious concern that courts‘ excessive involvement in agency rulemaking 
has contributed to a paralysis in the administrative process.
222
 These 
commentators warn that activist judicial review of agency rulemaking has 
 
 
 220. See supra Part III.C. 
 221. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1970); LOWI, supra note 162. 
 222. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 183 (arguing for an efficient and effective informal 
rulemaking process that is unhampered by fears of judicial or political reversal); R. Shep Melnick, 
Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 246 (1992) (―Judicial review 
has subjected agencies to debilitating delay and uncertainty.‖). 
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had a number of adverse effects.
223
 They charge that judicial review 
overburdens the rulemaking process by creating excessive uncertainty, 
increasing costs, encouraging forum shopping, and otherwise impeding 
agency effectiveness.
224
  
1. General Principles of Judicial Review 
The principal securities statutes lay out procedures and standards for 
judicial review of agency rules.
225
 For example, Section 25 of the 
Exchange Act provides for special statutory review of rules promulgated 
under certain sections of the act.
226
 It instructs courts to set aside rules if 
the SEC‘s action is ―found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; or without 
observance of procedure required by law.‖227 For SEC rules not 
specifically covered by Section 25 or other securities law provisions, the 
APA provides for judicial review under the same ―arbitrary and 
capricious‖ standard.228  
Despite the broad discretion implied by the terms ―arbitrary‖ and 
―capricious‖, courts are far less deferential to agency decision making than 
 
 
 223. See McGarity, supra note 183, at 1386 (―The informal rulemaking process of the 1990s is so 
heavily laden with additional procedures, analytical requirement, and external review mechanisms that 
its superiority to case-by-case adjudication is not as apparent now . . . .‖); Melnick, supra note 222, at 
247–48. 
 224. McGarity, supra note 183, at 1400; Richard J. Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: 
Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 301–02. 
 225. E.g., Exchange Act § 25(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(y)(b) (2000).  
 226. Exchange Act § 25(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. s 78y(b)(1) (2000). Section 25 provides for judicial 
review of rules promulgated under sections 6, 9(b)(2), 11, 11A, 15(c)(5) or (6), 17 or 19 of the 
Exchange Act. Any person adversely effected by these specified rules can seek direct judicial review 
in a Federal Court of Appeals within sixty days of the rule‘s promulgation.  
 The Exchange Act and other securities statutes also provide special review in the Court of 
Appeals for final SEC orders. Exchange Act § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78y (2000); Securities Act § 9(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 77(i)(a) (2000) (providing for judicial review of final orders in an appeals court); Investment 
Company Act § 42, U.S.C. § 80a-42(a) (2000) (providing for court review of SEC orders under the 
Investment Company Act in an appeals court); Investment Advisers Act § 213(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
13(a) (2000) (providing review of orders made under the Investment Advisers Act in an appeals court). 
Courts have undertaken judicial review of SEC rules adopted under these securities statutes pursuant 
to the provisions cited above. 
 227. Exchange Act § 25(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78(y)(b)(4) (2000). Facts identified by the SEC as 
forming the basis for the rule are considered conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. The 
substantial evidence standard requires greater judicial scrutiny than the arbitrary and capricious 
standard. See Nat‘l Audubon Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 1437, 1445 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 228. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
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a literal interpretation would suggest.
229
 When agency rulemaking is 
challenged, reviewing courts take a ―hard look‖ at the agency‘s decision to 
determine whether or not it is reasonable.
230
 Courts traditionally scrutinize 
the administrative record and the agency‘s explanation for the rule to 
determine ―whether the decision was based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.‖231 
The purpose of such review is ―to determine whether the agency applied 
the correct analytical methodology, applied the right criteria, considered 
the relevant factors, chose from among the available range of regulatory 
options, relied upon appropriate policies, and pointed to adequate support 
in the record for material empirical conclusions.‖232 
The degree of discretion courts afford to agencies is complicated by 
judicial trends that have developed in light of the Supreme Court‘s 
landmark Chevron decision. In Chevron USA v. National Resources 
Defense Council,
233
 the Court held that when a provision of a statute is 
ambiguous, courts should defer to an agency‘s reasonable interpretation of 
the statutes it administers.
234
 Although Chevron is widely perceived to 
compel greater judicial deference to agencies,
235
 in reality it has continued 
 
 
 229. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). However, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review does generally result in the 
application of a ―relatively deferential rational basis test to the agency action under review.‖ ALFRED 
C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 463 (2001). Some commentators and 
courts have noted that the differences between the arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence 
standards are, at this point, largely semantic. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Dep‘t of Transp., 593 F.2d 
1338, 1343 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 830 (1979); William F. Pederson Jr., Formal 
Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 48–49 (1975). 
 230. McGarity, supra note 183, at 1410 & n.123. 
 231. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see BREYER ET AL., 
supra note 160, at 347–404. 
 232. McGarity, supra note 183, at 1410. 
 233. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 234. Id. at 866. The two-step analysis outlined in Chevron has been refined in later cases. In 
Christensen v. Harris County, the Court held that an agency opinion letter did not automatically 
receive Chevron deference since it did not have the force of law, but it was instead afforded to the 
more intrusive Skidmore deference. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). In United States v. Mead Corp., the 
Court held that administrative implementation of a statute is entitled to Chevron deference only when 
that agency is exercising its congressionally delegated power to resolve statutory ambiguity. 533 U.S. 
218, 218 (2001). Unlike Chevron, which takes ―ambiguity to signify delegation, Mead establishes that 
the default rule runs against delegation.‖ Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 348 (2003). (―Unless the reviewing court affirmatively finds that Congress 
intended to delegate interpretive authority to the particular agency . . . Chevron deference is not due 
. . . .‖). These cases restrict the situations in which courts can apply Chevron deference, allowing for 
increased scrutiny of agencies‘ interpretations of statutes. 
 235. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006) (―Chevron has 
signaled a substantial increase in agency discretion to make policy through statutory interpretation.‖); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of 
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 313 (1988) (―[I]f courts apply the Chevron test 
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to enmesh judges in the mire of administrative decision making.
236
 As 
applied, Chevron has had the effect of converting many controversies over 
agency rulemaking that would otherwise be governed under the APA‘s 
more deferential ―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard into questions of 
statutory interpretation, for which judges can credibly claim equal, if not 
superior, expertise to agency administrators.
237
 By treating questions of 
administration as matters of statutory interpretation, courts have remained 
at least as involved in agency policy as under the oft-maligned ―hard look‖ 
standard.
238
 
2. Ossification Concerns 
The problems caused by judicial impediments to agency rulemaking 
create a phenomenon administrative law scholars have labeled 
―ossification.‖239 As Professor Thomas McGarity describes the problem, 
―[a]n assortment of analytical requirements have been imposed on the 
simple rulemaking model, and evolving judicial doctrines have obliged 
agencies to take greater pains to ensure that the technical bases for rules 
are capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.‖240 Similarly, Professor Shep 
Melnick asserts that ―[j]udicial review has subjected agencies to 
debilitating delay and uncertainty. Courts have heaped new tasks on 
agencies while decreasing their ability to perform any of them.‖241  
 
 
universally, judges will have less room to infuse their personal political philosophies in the Nation‘s 
policy making process.‖); Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: 
Congressional Intent, Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 833 
(2007) (―[T]his new model restricts the scope of Chevron‘s application, [but] allows greater freedom 
to agencies to formulate their own statutory interpretations and to revise them than did the earlier 
law.‖). 
 236. Rates of judicial affirmance of agency decisions have remained relatively stable pre- and 
post-Chevron. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006) (finding that even after Chevron, 
the political convictions of federal judges affects judicial review of agency interpretations of law); 
Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (1998) (finding a post-Chevron affirmance rate of 73% in 
1995–96); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1039 (finding an affirmance rate of 70.9% of pre-
Chevron cases and an affirmance rate of 75.5% post-Chevron in 1988). 
 237. See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 676–77, 703 
(2007). 
 238. See id. at 677.  
 239. McGarity, supra note 183, at 1368. 
 240. Id. at 1385. 
 241. Melnick, supra note 222, at 246. 
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Professors McGarity, Melnick and others maintain that intense judicial 
scrutiny of agency rulemaking has created several major problems. The 
most significant of these are prolonged delays and increased costs.
242
 In 
anticipation of legal challenges and a ―hard look‖ review, agencies 
respond by preparing lengthy explanations of the rules and engaging in 
exhaustive analysis. The costs of the requisite studies sometimes run into 
the millions of dollars and the time for an agency to promulgate a rule can 
extend for years, sometimes as long as a decade.
243
  
The unappealing prospect of devoting the inordinate time and expense 
required for rulemaking is compounded by uncertainty about whether a 
proposed rule will be upheld by the courts.
244
 Given the particularized, 
fact-intensive nature of judicial review, agencies cannot possibly 
anticipate what factors the court will consider significant, and which 
alternatives among many a judicial panel will conclude were worthy of the 
agency‘s consideration. This uncertainty compels agencies to engage in 
exhaustive analysis, provide elaborate justifications for policies, and 
respond to all comments no matter how germane.
245
 
Not only are agencies stymied in predicting what factors a reviewing 
court will consider significant, they engage in regulatory roulette when 
adopting controversial rules, as the ideological composition of the panel 
that will review the rule cannot be foreseen.
246
 Most rulemaking 
challenges are heard in the D.C. Circuit, which is well known for its sharp 
ideological divide.
247
 A rule that is too stringent is likely to be challenged 
by industry, and a rule that is too permissive will provoke a lawsuit from a 
public interest group.
248
 Many scholars maintain that the outcome of 
litigation in these circumstances is influenced less by the substantive 
merits of the rule or the procedure followed in its promulgation, than by 
the political ideology of the judges assigned to review the rule.
249
 
The litigation risks that accompany rulemaking make agencies more 
reluctant to engage in this form of policymaking. This reluctance reduces 
 
 
 242. Pierce, supra note 224, at 301. 
 243. McGarity, supra note 183, at 1387–91. 
 244. Pierce, supra note 224, at 302. 
 245. Id. at 301; Melnick, supra note 222, at 247. 
 246. Pierce, supra note 224, at 300. 
 247. Id. at 302. Challenges to many SEC rules can be brought by an aggrieved person directly to 
the ―Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of business, or for 
the District of Columbia Circuit . . . . See Exchange Act § 25(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2000); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 225–28. 
 248. See Pierce, supra note 224, at 302.  
 249. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 236, at 870–71 (2006); Pierce, supra note 224, at 302; 
Melnick, supra note 222, at 247. 
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regulatory flexibility. A rule that has survived the treacherous litigation 
process is unlikely to be amended as such action reopens a Pandora‘s box. 
As a result, agencies stick to their guns and rely on less transparent 
methods for adjusting their policies. These alternative regulatory methods, 
which include licensing, adjudication, product recalls, and interpretative 
statements (and, in the SEC‘s case, no-action letters) are less transparent 
but better insulated from judicial review.
250
  
The undesirable fallout of aggressive judicial review has led many 
scholars to urge courts to adopt a more deferential approach when 
reviewing agency rules.
251
 These scholars maintain that by virtue of their 
expertise, administrators are better positioned than judges to make most 
policy determinations.
252
 Because the executive and legislative branches 
exercise oversight over agency decisions, judicial review can afford to be 
significantly relaxed.
253
  
B. The Destabilizing Threat of Aggressive Judicial Review 
Although administrative law scholars tend to focus on agencies such as 
the EPA, NHTSA, and OSHA, their concerns apply with equal force to 
trends in judicial review of SEC rulemaking. Recently, federal courts have 
shown a marked willingness to reject SEC rules at the behest of organized 
business interests.
254
 In 2005 and 2006, two significant rulemaking 
projects were derailed in this manner. On a deliberative account such 
decisions have unnecessarily constrained the SEC‘s regulatory authority, 
impeding its ability to fulfill its statutory mandate. These decisions 
reinforce concerns voiced by ―ossification‖ scholars that judicial activism 
is unwittingly undermining the deliberative nature of the administrative 
process.
255
 
 
 
 250. McGarity, supra note 183, at 1440–43; Melnick, supra note 222, at 247–48; Pierce, supra 
note 224, at 301, 311 (asserting that the NHTSA retreated from rulemaking and instead implements its 
policy in an ad hoc manner by issuing recalls for defective products); see also Robert A. Anthony, 
―Well, You Want the Permit, Don’t You?‖ Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the 
Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (1992); Nagy, supra note 176, at 933–36. 
 251. Melnick, supra note 222, at 258 (―Judges should remember a key part of the Hippocratic 
oath: First, do no harm. In administrative law that translates into the command, defer! defer!‖). 
 252. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 158, at 577 (―[T]he courts are probably the institution least-
well suited to making policy decisions that avoid cognitive traps.‖). 
 253. Many commentators are more sympathetic to the need for aggressive judicial review. See, 
e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490–91 (2002); Macey, supra note 170, at 2418. 
 254. See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 255. Melnick, supra note 222, at 251 (―[J]udicial review short-circuits real deliberation about 
what constitutes good policy.‖). 
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As previously mentioned, the SEC long enjoyed a reputation as one of 
the most respected federal agencies.
256
 It traditionally commanded strong 
support from Wall Street and corporations that valued the disclosure 
regime and the enforcement apparatus that help support public confidence 
in the markets.
257
 For the most part the SEC has sought to work 
cooperatively with Wall Street, the accounting industry, and other 
industries within its regulatory purview. At times, however, these 
cooperative efforts fail. When industry is unable to thwart SEC 
rulemaking through persuasion or political pressure, it sometimes appeals 
to courts. Beginning in the late 1980s, industry groups have found success 
in challenging SEC rules on substantive and procedural grounds. These 
precedents are troubling, as they embolden regulated entities and the 
courts to meddle unnecessarily in otherwise sound rulemaking procedures. 
These ―wing-clipping‖ decisions also have the deleterious effect of 
encouraging the SEC to rely more heavily on less formal policy 
pronouncements such as interpretive releases, no-action letters, and 
enforcement actions that are spared of the procedural rigors of the APA 
rulemaking.
258
 This increased reliance on these more informal policy 
mechanisms renders SEC policy less transparent, and therefore less 
accessible to regulated parties and to the general public.  
1. The Classic Case 
Business Roundtable v. SEC represents the classic case in which 
federal courts rejected an SEC rule on the motion of a regulated party.
259
 
The controversy arose when the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4, a new rule that 
forbade national stock exchanges from listing shares of common stock that 
failed to adhere to the governance principle of one vote per share of stock 
owned by a stockholder.
260
 Rule 19c-4 was adopted in response to General 
Motors‘ proposal to issue a new class of common stock with one-half vote 
per share. This plan conflicted with the exchange‘s longstanding rule that 
required that all common stock listed on the exchange enjoy one vote per 
share.
261
 Rather than enforce its rule, the NYSE proposed abandoning it.
262
 
 
 
 256. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.  
 257. SELIGMAN, supra note 158, at xx; Prentice, supra note 163, at 800; KHADEMIAN, supra note 
141, at 95–99. 
 258. Nagy, supra note 176, at 958–962; see also Pierce, supra note 224, at 301. 
 259. 905 F. 2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 260. Id. at 407. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
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The SEC intervened with Rule 19c-4, which prohibited national stock 
exchanges from listing any common stock that was the product of a mid-
stream, dual-class recapitalization.
263
  
The Business Roundtable challenged the rule, arguing that the SEC 
lacked authority to adopt it.
264
 The D.C. Circuit Court agreed.
265
 It held 
that the SEC had crossed a jurisdictional line when it adopted a rule that 
―directly controls the substantive allocation of powers among classes of 
shareholders.‖266 In adopting the one-share one-vote policy, the SEC relied 
on Section 19(c) of the Exchange Act, a provision that authorizes the 
agency to amend the rules of an SRO as it ―deems necessary or 
appropriate . . . in furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act].‖267  
Despite the broad conception of that purpose embraced by Congress, 
which included such expansive objectives as ―protect[ing] investors‖ and 
―in the public interest,‖ the court credited a much narrower view, and 
concluded that the Act‘s purposes were limited to enhancing corporate 
disclosure.
268
 The court foreswore the notion that Congress envisioned that 
the SEC would force upon the exchanges rules pertaining to ―substance‖ 
as opposed to mere ―disclosure.‖269 The court therefore concluded that 
―the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include regulation of an issue 
that is so far beyond matters of disclosure . . . and of the management and 
practices of self-regulatory organizations, and that is concededly a part of 
corporate governance traditionally left to the states.‖270  
By crediting industry efforts to limit the scope of the SEC‘s authority 
in a manner not clearly intended by Congress, Business Roundtable 
represented a shot across the bow, prodding the agency into a more 
cautious regulatory posture. Post-Business Roundtable, a truce of sorts 
ensued, with the stock exchanges voluntarily adopting the rule the SEC 
 
 
 263. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2007). 
 264. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407. The Business Roundtable is an organization of chief 
executives of the nation‘s largest corporations. Business Roundtable, About Us, http://www.business 
roundtable.org/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
 265. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000). 
 268. Id. at 412. 
 269. Id. at 411. 
 270. 905 F.2d at 408. As I have argued elsewhere, Business Roundtable‘s constraint on SEC 
rulemaking is based on an inappropriately narrow conception of the SEC‘s regulatory mandate: the 
notion that the federal securities laws are geared exclusively toward disclosure rather than conduct 
regulation. See supra notes 257–69. Although a number of securities law provisions belie this common 
notion, it nonetheless continues to guide courts as they consider challenges to agency actions. Jones, 
supra note 24, at 886–88; see also Jeffrey Y. Wu, Revisiting Business Roundtable and Section 19(c) in 
the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 249 (2006). 
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had sought to impose.
271
 Still, Business Roundtable remained a beacon of 
inspiration for industry groups in their efforts to forestall unwanted 
regulation, and litigation threats have loomed in the background whenever 
the SEC proposed to tread on uncharted regulatory terrain.
272
 
2. Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds 
Just as Congress was compelled to respond to the 2001/2002 
accounting scandals with new mandatory corporate governance standards, 
the SEC faced a number of market-related scandals at the turn of the 
century. One set of scandals related to conflicts that pervaded the mutual 
fund industry. At the same time, the SEC struggled to formulate a policy 
to respond to the growing market influence of a new form of private 
investment vehicle, commonly referred to as hedge funds.
273
  
The mutual fund scandals and market dislocations threatened by 
unstable hedge funds were serious enough to command regulators‘ 
attention, yet they lacked the political salience necessary to spur Congress 
to action. This regulatory space occupied by the scandals represents a 
middle ground in which the SEC‘s role as first responder is critical. The 
SEC responded to the mutual fund and hedge fund problems with new 
rulemaking initiatives that worked their way through the normal notice 
and comment process.
274
 Both initiatives garnered significant attention in 
the business press and among commentators and industry groups. When 
industry failed to thwart rulemaking through the normal deliberative 
 
 
 271. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 565, 625–26 (1991). 
 272. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce threatened to sue the SEC if it adopted the 
highly-contested shareholder access proposal. Phil McCarty, SEC’s Proxy Plan Threatened with Suit 
by Business Chamber, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at A6; see also Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, 
Chairman, Bus. Roundtable to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec‘y, Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n (Dec. 22, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt12203.htm (asserting that the SEC lacks 
authority to adopt the proposed shareholder access rule). This threat may have played a role in former-
Chairman Donaldson‘s hesitancy and ultimate unwillingness to support the proposal. See Stephen 
Labaton, S.E.C. Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2. The ABA also 
lobbied strenuously to discourage the SEC from adopting the ―reporting out‖ requirement, proposed as 
part of the SEC‘s new attorney conduct rules adopted under the auspices of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass‘n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec‘y, U.S. Sec. 
and Exch. Comm‘n (Dec. 18 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/initial_ 
comment.pdf. 
 273. For helpful background on the hedge fund regulation issue see Troy A. Paredes, On the 
Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 975; Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1 (2006). 
 274. Both of these rulemaking initiatives were preceded by prolonged dialogue with industry 
parties in the form of roundtables and task forces. 
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channels, it turned to the courts for solace. These groups (or an individual 
in the case of the hedge fund rule) successfully sued to overturn or delay 
implementation of the new rules.  
a. Mutual Funds 
In Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, the court twice remanded new SEC 
rules governing mutual funds for further analysis and consideration.
275
 In 
2004, the SEC amended its exemptive rules under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, which governs mutual funds.
276
 These amendments 
essentially mandated that at least 75% of the directors on a mutual fund 
board be independent and that an independent chairman preside over each 
fund (collectively the ―Independence Requirements‖).277 The 
Independence Requirements were adopted in response to scandals that 
were plaguing the mutual fund industry at the time. Investigations by state 
securities regulators had exposed widespread trading abuses, including late 
trading and market timing by favored mutual fund customers.
278
  
The SEC viewed these abuses as evidence that mutual fund boards 
were inadequately policing conflicts of interest between mutual funds and 
their managers, and reasoned that an increased presence of independent 
directors would lead to a higher quality of monitoring of conflicts by 
directors and trustees.
279
 Mutual fund giants Fidelity and Vanguard 
vigorously opposed the rule and led a public relations campaign in an 
effort to defeat it.
280
 Despite this opposition, the new rules were adopted 
by a 3–2 SEC vote, with outgoing SEC-chair William Donaldson casting 
the deciding vote.  
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce challenged the rule in federal court, 
claiming the SEC lacked the authority to adopt it, and that the rulemaking 
 
 
 275. 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Chamber I]; Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d 
890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Chamber II]. 
 276. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (2000). 
 277. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26520 (Jul. 27, 
2004) [hereinafter Mutual Fund Release], available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/ic-26520.htm. 
 278. See Jones, supra note 144, at 119–21. 
 279. Mutual Fund Release, supra note 277. 
 280. In addition to submitting a comment letter opposing the rule, Fidelity commissioned a study 
that purported to show that mutual funds with independent chairs did not perform better than those 
without. Letter from Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President, Fidelity Mgm‘t & Research Co., to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec‘y, Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s70304/fidelity031804.htm. Its leaders also published op-ed columns in prominent business journals 
decrying the new rules. See Edward C. Johnson, III, ‗Interested’—and Proud of It!, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
17, 2004, at A20 (Op-ed by Fidelity‘s chairman). 
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procedure did not comply with the requirements of the APA.
281
 Although 
the court rejected the Chamber‘s broadest claims, it remanded the rule for 
further consideration.
282
 The court applied exacting scrutiny to the 
question of whether the agency had ―examine[d] the relevant data and 
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.‖283 Although it 
rejected the Chamber‘s argument that a failure to perform empirical 
analysis or to consider empirical data prepared by others violated the 
APA,
284
 the court was unsympathetic to the SEC‘s claim that it was unable 
to assess the costs of the new requirements. Such difficulties in assessing 
compliance costs did not excuse the SEC from determining as best it could 
the rule‘s economic implications.285 The court ruled that the SEC‘s failure 
to adequately consider the costs of the rules violated its obligations under 
the Investment Company Act and the APA.
286
 Accordingly, the court 
remanded the rule to the SEC to correct the stated deficiencies in the 
rulemaking process.
287
 
The SEC responded to the ruling by quickly preparing the mandated 
cost estimates and re-promulgating the identical rule, which was approved 
again on a 3–2 vote, timed to occur just before Chairman Donaldson‘s 
departure from the agency.
288
 The Chamber again challenged the rule, and 
again the court rejected it.
289
 The basis of the second ruling was the SEC‘s 
consideration of a report that was not part of the public rulemaking record 
 
 
 281. Chamber I, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 282. Id. at 140–45. The court rejected the Chamber‘s claim that the Commission lacked authority 
to regulate corporate governance, an area traditionally viewed as within the province of the states. 
Holding Business Roundtable inapposite, it concluded that the purposes of the Investment Company 
Act included tempering conflicts of interests and regulating the governance structure of mutual funds. 
Id. at 139. 
 283. Id. at 140 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
 284. The court rejected this argument stating that ―an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its 
every action upon empirical data.‖ Id. at 142. 
 285. Id. The Investment Company Act requires that the SEC consider a rule‘s ―impact on 
competitiveness,‖ 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-2c (2000), which the court interpreted to mandate an assessment 
of the new rule‘s costs to mutual funds. Chamber I, 412 F.3d at 142, 144. 
 286. Id. at 144. The court also ruled the SEC failed to give adequate consideration to alternatives 
to the rule in violation of the APA. According to the court, the SEC should have considered the 
―disclosure alternative‖ under which funds would be required to disclose whether or not they had an 
independent chair, leaving investors to make an informed investment choice. Id. at 144, 145. 
 287. Id. at 145. 
 288. The rule was re-promulgated within one week of the court‘s decision. 
 289. Chamber II, 443 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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and thus not afforded adequate consideration during the notice and 
comment period.
290
 
Under Chairman Cox, the SEC reopened notice and comment on the 
Independence Requirements. However, the proposal lay dormant after the 
comment period expired, as the SEC lacked initiative to move forward on 
the proposal for a third time. The end result was substantial, yet less than 
complete, compliance with the Independence Requirements.
291
 
b. Hedge Funds 
In Goldstein v. SEC,
292
 the D.C. Circuit invalidated the SEC‘s hedge 
fund rule which had required hedge fund advisors to register with the 
SEC.
293
 The new rule revised the agency‘s interpretation of the term 
―client‖ under the Investment Advisers Act (the ―Advisers Act‖) so as to 
require previously exempt hedge funds to register under the act.
294
 The 
Advisers Act provides an exemption from registration for investment 
advisers with fewer than fifteen clients.
295
 In the past, the SEC had 
interpreted the term ―client‖ to allow advisers to consider entities such as 
partnerships and trusts as a single client, and to disregard the investors in 
such entities for purposes of determining their eligibility for the private 
adviser‘s exemption.  
The new rule required hedge fund advisers to count as ―clients‖ all of 
the investors in the partnerships or other entities that they advised; an 
interpretation that eliminated the private adviser exemption for most hedge 
funds.
296
 Like the mutual fund Independence Requirements, the hedge 
fund rule was adopted by a divided SEC in a 3–2 vote.297  
 
 
 290. Id. at 908.  
 291. Tatiana Serafin, Who’s In Charge Here?, FORBES, Sept. 17, 2007, at 162; John Morgan, 
Funds Choose More Independent Directors, MONEY MGT. EXECUTIVE, Nov. 19, 2007, at 1 (citing 
ICI/IDC survey reporting that by late 2006, 88% of funds met the 75% independent director 
requirements and 56% had an independent chairman). 
 292. 451 F.3d. 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 293. A hedge fund is generally understood to be a private investment vehicle for wealthy investors 
that is exempt from the SEC‘s registration requirements under the Investment Company Act and the 
Investment Advisers Act. 
 294. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. IA-2333 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Rule], available at http://www.sec. 
gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm. 
 295. Advisers Act, § 203(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000). 
 296. Goldstein, 451 F.3d. at 877. 
 297. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 294. The two non-Chair Republican Commissioners, Cynthia 
Glassman and Paul Atkins, dissented from the rule and described it as ―the wrong solution to an 
undefined problem.‖ Id.  
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Philip Goldstein, a hedge fund manager, sued. He argued the SEC had 
misinterpreted the Advisers Act‘s private adviser exemption.298 The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.
299
 It concluded the SEC‘s interpretation 
came ―close to violating the plain language of the statute,‖ and that it was 
―counterintuitive to characterize the investors in a hedge fund as the 
‗clients‘ of the adviser.‖300 The court also found that that the SEC had 
failed to justify the rule, because it had not ―adequately explained how the 
relationship between hedge fund investors and advisers justifies treating 
the former as clients of the latter.‖301 The court thus concluded that the 
rule was arbitrary and vacated it.
302
  
C. The Need for Greater Judicial Deference 
In Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, and Goldstein, the 
D.C. Circuit found a basis for rejecting SEC rules on the motion of 
regulated parties or their representatives. In each case the grounds for the 
rejection differed, yet the stories behind these failed rulemaking efforts are 
remarkably similar: (1) a high stakes rule introducing a new regulatory 
burden or revoking regulatory relief is proposed by the SEC, (2) organized 
business interests strenuously object to the rule, making their views known 
to the SEC through comment letters, private lobbying, and public 
commentary, (3) the rulemaking proceeds despite industry objections, and 
(4) the disappointed parties then appeal to federal courts where they find a 
more receptive audience for their concerns. 
Courts have little difficulty finding deficiencies in the SEC‘s reasoning, 
its procedural practices, or the administrative record.
303
 Honing in on the 
fatal flaw, the court rejects the rule. Whether the court remands or vacates 
the rule, the litigation has the effect of taking the wind from the agency‘s 
sails and the rulemaking project typically falters. Interestingly, however, 
despite judicial defeat, the agency often finds a way to effect its desired 
policy. In the one share/one vote controversy, the SEC managed to cajole 
the stock exchanges to voluntarily adopt the rule it sought to impose.
304
 In 
the Chamber of Commerce case, many mutual funds opted to comply 
 
 
 298. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878. 
 299. Id. at 878–81. 
 300. Id. at 881. 
 301. Id. at 882. 
 302. Id. at 884. 
 303. Pierce, supra note 224, at 310 (―[A]ny issue can be considered so significant that failure to 
address it ‗adequately‘ and ‗objectively‘ will yield judicial reversal and remand of a rule.‖). 
 304. Bainbridge, supra note 271, at 625–26. 
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voluntarily with the independence requirements rather than deal with the 
uncertainty wrought by drawn out litigation. Similarly, some hedge fund 
advisers opted to register voluntarily with the SEC rather than await the 
outcome of the Goldstein litigation, and the agency continues to consider 
alternative methods for regulating hedge funds.
305
 The result is that the 
SEC‘s desired policy sometimes becomes adopted as a best practice. 
As adherents to the ―ossification‖ viewpoint have argued, close judicial 
scrutiny of agency rulemaking accomplishes little more than exacerbating 
agency gridlock (although that may be the main point). Because the 
outcome of any prospective litigation is unpredictable, agencies adopt a 
defensive posture, spending more time and money to justify their rules 
prior to final rulemaking. Judicial oversight does little to stem the 
agency‘s regulatory (or deregulatory) vigor. And when rulemaking fails, 
the agency will likely seek alternative methods of effecting its desired 
policy.  
The ultimate effect of intrusive judicial review is to deprive the SEC of 
its ability to nimbly address new problems and challenges that arise in the 
financial markets. Such review rarely has the effect of substantively 
altering the agency‘s course of conduct. But, by forcing policymaking to a 
more informal rubric, judicial scrutiny deprives the public of the 
deliberative advantages of APA rulemaking, undermining the very value 
of public accountability the courts claim to be protecting. The unfortunate 
result is less certainty for regulated parties and investors, and less 
transparency to the public. The cure for this dilemma is greater deference 
to SEC rulemaking by regulated parties, commentators, and most 
importantly, the courts. 
 
 
 305. See Todd Zaun, Note, Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 J. BUS. 
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 Hedge fund regulation is back on the agenda as Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has 
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new ―systemic risk‖ regulator to oversee financial markets. See U. S. Department of the Treasury, 
Press Release: Treasury Outlines Framework For Regulatory Reform, available at http://www. 
treasury.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has assessed the mechanisms for crafting American 
corporate law rules against a backdrop of core democratic principles. The 
Article has shown that although the state lawmaking regime fails to 
comport with democratic values, the legitimacy of the broader structure is 
more robust. Our corporate regulatory structure consists of layers of 
authority, and democratic protections at the federal level help to 
compensate for flaws which are apparent in state lawmaking processes. 
The Article identifies regulatory redundancy (represented by legislative 
rulemaking by the SEC) as a key component of the comprehensive 
structure that helps bring corporate lawmaking closer in line with our 
democratic values. It therefore urges courts to accord more deference to 
the agency‘s rulemaking authority. By constraining SEC rulemaking, 
courts detract from the agency‘s ability to handle adeptly the broad array 
of tasks that Congress has delegated to it. In so doing, courts risk 
undermining the legitimacy of our corporate governance system. 
Although the Article emphasizes the undesirable impact of aggressive 
judicial review of SEC rules, its insights have broader implications. The 
regulatory failure laid bare by the current global financial crisis only 
reinforces the need for a robust financial regulatory structure. The crisis 
demonstrates that a lack of effective regulation puts at risk much more 
than private losses for investors. Indeed, regulatory failure has the 
potential to destabilize the entire global economy.  
A greater appreciation of the SEC‘s central role in overseeing corporate 
conduct seems particularly crucial in light of currently circulating 
proposals for financial regulatory reform.
306
 Efforts to weaken the SEC‘s 
independence or limit the scope of its authority are misguided, as these are 
the very institutional characteristics by which the SEC contributes to the 
legitimacy of corporate regulation. Reform proposals that seek to 
centralize corporate regulatory authority within the executive branch, or to 
otherwise restrict opportunities for democratic deliberation, would only 
serve to further threaten the stability of the corporate law regime. 
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